PART I. CURRENT PERSPECTIVES

THE POSITIONAL-RISK DOCTRINE IN
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
BY

ARTHUR LARSON*

The "positional-risk" doctrine in workmen's compensation may be
stated as follows: An injury "arises out of" the employment if it
would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions or obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where he was
injured by a neutral force, meaning by "neutral" neither personal to the
claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment. A classic, if
somewhat archaic, set of facts illustrating the doctrine is supplied by
the New Jersey case of Gargiulo v. Gargiulo.' A butcher's helper, on
his way to empty trash, was struck in the eye by a stray arrow shot into
the air by a child in the neighborhood. The New Jersey Supreme
Court, in awarding compensation, said:
It [the employment] brought him unwittingly into the line of fire
of the arrow, where he would not have been except for his employment.
But for the compliance with his allotted work directive requiring his presence at the particular time and place in question, the injury would not
have been inflicted. 2
This doctrine, whose origins seem to go back at least as far as
1927,1 can by no means claim majority rule status, but it has been accepted in at least some factual categories by an impressive and growing
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1. 13 NJ. 8, 97 A.2d 593 (1953).
2. Id. at 13, 97 A.2d at 596.
3. What appears to be the earliest statement of the positional risk principle as a
general doctrine occurs in the Colorado case of Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
81 Colo. 233, 254 P. 995 (1927). See text accompanying notes 19-22 infra.
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number of jurisdictions. The purpose of this article is to show, by
drawing on a wide assortment of apparently unrelated categories, that
there can and should be recognized a universal and pervading causal
principle along the lines just described as the positional-risk doctrine,
and to demonstrate further that, once a jurisdiction has adopted the doctrine in one category, it should logically extrapolate it to every type of
neutral-risk case presenting the question of causal relation between the
injury and the employment.
The doctrine has potential applicability in practically every jurisdiction, in spite of some variations in the statutory backdrop. Fortytwo states, and the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,4 have adopted the entire British Compensation Act formula:
injury "arising out of and in the course of employment."' One state,
Utah, changed it to "arising out of or in the course of employment."0
As to variants on the "arising out of" portion, West Virginia preferred
"resulting from"; 7 Wyoming substituted the phrase 'injuries directly and
solely caused by a traumatic accident in the employment"; 8 and North
Dakota, 9 Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act omitted the "arising out of" idea altogether. As to the "course of employment" concept, forty-seven states
have this phrase; Wisconsin has, instead, the words "[w]here . . .
performing service growing out of and incidental to his employment"; 0
the Federal Employees' Compensation Act" uses the phrase "sustained
while in the performance of duty."
THE

FOUR LINEs OF INTERPRETATION OF "ARISING OUT OF"

To appreciate what a distance compensation decisional law has
traveled to reach the positional-risk doctrine, one must review briefly
three other lines of interpretation of the "arising" phrase that have figured in this development.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

33 U.S.C. § 901-41, 944-50 (1970).
See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION §

5.20 (1953).

UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-45 (1953).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-1 (1970).
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-49(III)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1971).

9. N.D. CENT. CODE, tit. 65, § 65-01-02(8) (1960): "'Injury' shall mean only.
an injury arising in the course of employment.
10. Wis. STAT. § 102.03(1)(c) (1957).
11. FECA § l(a), 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (1970).
Puerto Rico has a formulation of its own: "caused by any act or function inherent in their work or employment, when such accidents happen in the course of said
work or empbyment, and as a consequence thereof." LAWS OF P.R. ANN., tit. 11, § 2
(1962).

THE POSITIONAL-RISK DOCTRINE

The earliest was the "peculiar-risk" doctrine. Under this doctrine,
which in the early dawn of American compensation law was actually
the dominant rule, the claimant had to show that the source of the
harm was in its nature peculiar to his occupation. Accordingly, even if
his work subjected him to a tremendously increased quantitative risk of
injury by heat, or cold, or lightning, the claimant might be turned away
with the comment that "everyone is subject to the same weather."' 2
Thus, in Robinson's Case,'3 a laborer froze his foot while working in
the public square all night in very cold weather. The court said:
"Tlhere is nothing to show that the employee was exposed to any
greater risk Qf freezing his foot than the ordinary person engaged in
outdoor work in cold weather.' 4 But, of course, the ordinary person
is not engaged in outdoor work in cold weather; and so to limit the
comparison was to rob the claimant's employment of the only distinctive
feature it had for present purposes.
The peculiar-risk test gradually achieved a well-deserved oblivion,
and was replaced by the increased-risk test. This test differs from the
peculiar-risk test in that the distinctiveness of the employment risk can
be contributed by the increased quantity of a risk that is qualitatively
not peculiar to the employment.
The increased-risk test is still the prevalent test in the United States
today, and, even in states that have accepted the positional-risk doctrine, a prudent lawyer will, in a lightning case for example, begin by
trying to prove that the employment increased the risk of exposure to
lightning by placing claimant on a height, or near metal, or in contact
with an element that conducts electricity.' 5
The next stage may be called the "actual-risk" doctrine. Under
this doctrine, a substantial number of courts are saying, in effect, "we
do not care whether this risk was also common to the public, if in fact
it was a risk of this employment."' 6 It is a more defensible rule than
the preceding one, since there is no real statutory basis for insisting
12. See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6.20 (1953).
13. 292 Mass. 543, 198 N.E. 760 (1935).
14. Id. at 546, 198 N.E. at 761.
15. For a typical increased-risk lightning award, see Bauer's Case 314 Mass. 4, 49
N.E.2d 118 (1943). The increased risk included presence -on top of an exposed hill,
wet clothes, and nearness to an iron bed and electrical wiring.
16. The leading actual-risk case is Hughes v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 245
N.Y. 201, 156 N.E. 665 (1927), which involved a section boss who suffered heat
prostration while working in a cemetery. The essence of the opinion of the New York
Court of Appeals is summed up in one sentence: "Although the risk be common to
all who are exposed to the sun's rays on a hot day, the question is whether the employment exposes the employee to the risk." Id. at 202-03, 156 N.E. at 665.
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upon a peculiar or increased risk, as long as the employment subjected
claimant to the actual risk that injured him.
The most advanced causal rule is the "positional-risk" doctrine
summarized in the opening sentence. It should be particularly noted,
in the phrasing of the doctrine, that the essence of the positional-risk
doctrine is that the source of harm be a "neutral" one. This point is
best approached by stressing that there are three categories of risk for
present purposes: distinctly occupational; distinctly personal; and neutral-i.e., risks having no particular personal or employment character.
The occupational-risk group comprises all the obvious kinds of injury that one thinks of at once as industrial injury. All the things that
can go wrong around a modem factory, mill, mine, transportation system, or construction project-machinery breaking, objects falling, explosives exploding, tractors tipping, fingers getting caught in gears, excavations caving in, and so on-are clearly in this category and constitute the bulk of what not only the public but perhaps also the original
draftsmen of compensation acts had in mind as their proper concern.
Equally obviously associated with the employment, however, are also
the occupational diseases, which, as the very name implies, are produced by the particular substances or conditions inherent in the environment of the employment. As far as the "arising" test is concerned,
this group causes no trouble, since all these risks fall readily within the
increased-risk test and are considered work-connected in all jurisdictions.
At the other extreme are origins of harm so clearly personal that,
even if they take effect while the employee is on the job, they could not
possibly be attributed to the employment. If the time has come for
the employee to die a natural death, or to expire from the effects of
some disease or internal weakness of which he would as promptly have
expired whether he had been working or not, the fact that his demise
takes place in an employment setting rather than at home does not, of
course, make the death compensable. Or if the employee has a mortal
personal enemy who has sworn to seek him out wherever he may be,
and if this enemy happens to find and murder the employee while the
latter is at work, the employment cannot be said to have had any causal
relation to the death. 1 7 The same is true if the employee, for reasons of
his own, carries a bomb in his bosom (as actually happened in one
case'8 ), and if the bomb goes off during business hours.
17. See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 11.21 (1972).
18. Bogavich v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 162 Pa. Super. 388, 57 A.2d 598
(1948).
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Between these two areas lies the third: that of risks of neither distinctly employment nor distinctly personal character. Illustrations of
this category may be drawn from a wide variety of controversial cases.
A man hard at work in the middle of a factory yard may be hit by a
stray bullet out of nowhere, bitten by a mad dog, stabbed by a lunatic
running amuck, struck by lightning, thrown down by a hurricane, killed
by an enemy bomb, injured by a piece of tin blown from someone's
roof, shot by a child playing with an air rifle, murdered as a result of
mistaken identity, felled by debris from a distant explosion, or blinded
by a flying beetle. Another kind of neutral-risk case is that in which
the cause itself, or the character of the cause, is simply unknown. An
employee may be found to have died on the job from unexplained
causes, or he may suffer a slip or fall for no reason that anyone, ineluding himself, can explain. An employee may be attacked by unknown persons, whose motives may have been personal or related to
the employment.
There are thus three categories of risk; but unfortunately, there
are only two places where the loss may fall-on the employer or on the
employee. And so the question becomes, who bears the burden of
this in-between category of harms?
The usual answer in the past has been to leave this loss on the employee, on the theory that he must meet the burden of proof of establishing affirmatively a clear causal connection between the conditions
under which he worked and the occurrence of the injury. More recently, some courts have reasoned in the following vein: Either the
employer or the employee must bear the loss; to show connection with
the employment, there is at least the fact that the injury occurred while
the employee was working; to show connection with the employee's
personal life there is nothing; therefore, although the work connection
is slender, it is at least stronger than any connection with the claimant's
personal life.
SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF THE POSITIONAL-RISK TEST

Lightning
With these theoretical considerations identified, the particular factual applications of the positional-risk doctrine may now be reviewed.
Since the first application of the rule' 9 seems to have been in a lightning
19. See note 3 supra.
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case, this category is an appropriate place to begin. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission,20 decided in 1927, the Supreme Court of Colorado was confronted with a textbook positionalrisk situation: A farm hand was killed by lightning while driving a
team of horses without a wagon. The effect of the decision was summarized in a concurring opinion as follows:
[W]hen one in the course of his employment is reasonably required
to be at a particular place at a particular time and there meets with an
accident, although one which any other person then and there present
would have met with irrespective of his employment, that21accident is one
"arising out of" the employment of the person so injured.
The court did not seem to be aware of the historic significance of
its brief opinion, as indicated by the following additional passage from
the court's opinion by Denison, J.:
A majority of the court thinks that, since Oakley's employment required him to be in a position where the lightning struck him, there was a
causal relation between employment and accident, so that the latter may
be said to arise out of the former and therefore the judgment should be
affirmed. The writer, however, is of the opinion, in which the Chief
Justice concurs, that the mere fact that duty calls the employee to the
place where he is killed or injured, is not enough; yet recognizes that
the precedents in this state and in the Supreme Court of the United
States extend even beyond limits which would include the present case
22
and so concurs in the result reached by the majority.
The court adduced no Supreme Court cases, but cited three Colorado cases: Indust);al Commission v. Pueblo Auto Co., 23 Industrial
Commission v. Hunter,24 and State Compensation Insurance Fund v.
Industrial Commission.25 It is curious that the court felt bound by
these three cases (each of which involved criminal attacks by highwaymen upon traveling employees, and which therefore could easily have
been explained and distinguished on increased-risk grounds) to state a
sweeping positional-risk rule designed to cover a case with no increasedrisk component at all. For whatever reason, the decision opened the
door to the positional-risk era.
Beyond this early example, there has been only one application of
the doctrine to a lightning case, and that does not appear to have sur20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

81 Colo. 233, 254 P. 995
Id. at 236, 254 P. at 996.
Id. at 234, 254 P. at 995.
71 Colo. 424, 207 P. 479
73 Colo. 226, 214 P. 393
80 Colo. 130, 249 P. 653

(1927).
(1922).
(1923).
(1926).
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vived. In E.L Du Pont de Nemours Co. v. Lilly,26 a lightning case,
the Appellate Court of Indiana abandoned the increased-risk test and
applied the positional-risk test, in the following language:
[HI]e would not have been on the transfer platform proceeding
along the platform in the direction of the shelter house at the particular
time and at the particular place where he was when struck by the bolt of
lightning except for the duties and place of his employment and the specific instructions and orders of his employer .... 27
Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court of Indiana, while affirming the Lilly case, chose to do so on the ground that there was evi28
dence on which a finding of increased hazard could properly be made.
The court did not criticize or disavow the positional theory, and it cited'
Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Dehn,2 9 which had first announced
the positional-risk doctrine in Indiana in an unexplained-fall case, without disapproval; but whether its decision is to be construed as indicating
an aversion to the theory, as the appellate court assumed in a later lightning case,3" or whether it means only that it did not propose to take
such a step in a case which could be disposed of on more conventional
grounds, remains to be seen. The Supreme Court of Indiana has not
been heard from on the precise point, but in the meantime the appellate
court is proceeding on the assumption that its brief excursion into josi3
tional-risk territory is a thing of the past. Thus, in Crites v. Baker, 1
the appellate court, while affirming compensation to a garbage truck
driver struck by an apple thrown from a school bts, continued its policy
of assuming that increased risk must be shown in Indiana. Since the
appellate court gave us Dehn and Lilly, presumably the appellate court
can take them away--even though the reason seems to be an unduly
broad implication from the supreme court's opinion affirming Lilly.
Tornadoes and windstorms
Two states, Louisiana and Michigan, have adopted the positionalrisk test in tornado cases.
Of the two, Louisiana's acceptance of this rule was much the earlier, having been announced in 1942. In awarding compensation to
an employee in a cottonseed mill which collapsed during a cyclone, the
court suggested that the decision might perhaps rest on the employment
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

75 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. App. 1947), aff'd, 226 Ind. 267, 79 N.E.2d 387 (1948).
75 N.E.2d 796, 798.
E.L DuPont de Nemours Co. v. Lilly, 226 Ind. 267, 79 N.E.2d 387 (1948).
110 Ind. App. 483, 39 N.E.2d 499 (1942).
Citizens Indep. Tel. Co. v. Davis, 120 Ind. App. 20, 94 N.E.2d 495 (1950).
276 N.E.2d 582 (Ind. App. 1971).
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risk resulting from the heavily loaded condition of the building, but it
said:
We prefer to place our decision on what we believe to be a sound
footing, that is-that the deceased, by reason of his employment, was required to be in a building which fell upon him; that his death was due to
the fact that his employment necessitated that he be at the place where
the accident occurred .... 32
Michigan arrived at a similar point twenty-eight years later, and
somewhat less effortlessly, in its 4-to-3 decision in Whetro v. Awkerman.a3 This case dealt with two separate claimants, one of whom was
killed and the other injured, at separate localities, but both as the result
of a tornado. Rejecting the contact-with-the-premises exception, 34 the
32. Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 731, 6 So. 2d 747, 751
(1942). The court also quoted the following significant language from the earlier
case of Kern v. Southport Mill, 174 La. 432, 437-38, 141 So. 19, 21 (1932), a streetrisk case:
By which [arising out of the employment] is meant, that the accident
must be the result of some risk to which the employee is subjected in the
course of his employment and to which he would not have been subjected
had he not been so employed.
But time, place, and circumstances must determine this. When the illfated Titanic foundered in the spring of 1912, all persons aboard her were
situated exactly alike as to time and place; but they were not all situated
alike as to circumstance. Those who traveled for pleasure were present of their
own free choice alone; those who traveled for business, whether their own
or that of another, were there of necessity. And, when one finds himself at the scene of an accident, not because he voluntarily appeared there
but because the necessities of his business called him there, the injuries he
may suffer by reason of such accident 'arise out of' his employment, if it so be
that he was employed and his employment required him to be at the place of
the accident at the time when the accident occurred.
The question whether or not the employee might have been injured in
the same way, and even at the same place and time had he not been called
there by the necessities of his employer's business, but had gone there only
for his own pleasure or in pursuit of his own business, has nothing whatever
to do with the case. 199 La. at 730, 6 So. 2d at 750.
33. 383 Mich. 235, 174 N.W.2d 783 (1970).
34. The contact-with-the-premises exception, which has been accepted in some form
by a number of courts, may be phrased as follows: Although the original force, such
as hurricane, lightning, or earthquake, did not arise out of the employment under the
increased-risk test, the injury may be compensable to the extent that it results from physical contact, produced by that force, with some part of the working environment.
In less abstract terms, while claimant cannot recover for the effects of the direct impact of the tornado on him, he can recover if the tornado blows down a wall which in
turn falls on him. The leading American authority for this rule is Caswell's Case, 305
Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940), a product of the New England hurricane of 1938.
Claimant was working in a mill of stout brick construction at the time the hurricane
struck. Buildings of all kinds in the area were destroyed. The force of the wind broke
in the windows, lifted the roof, and disintegrated the wall, with the result that claimant was crushed by bricks and debris. The court adopted the following rule from the
leading English case of Brooker v. Thomas Borthwick and Sons, [1933] A.C. 669, in
which a wall fell on the employee during an earthquake:
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court held that it was not necessary to establish a proximate causal relationship between the employment and injury in order to establish
compensability, and specifically rejected the "Act of God" defense.
Affirming awards of compensation, the court simply stated that the employee's employment was in each case the occasion for his injury, and
that therefore the injuries were compensable. This case appears to
adopt the positional-risk doctrine generally for the state of Michigan.
The court begins by conceding that the earlier lightning cases in Michigan were inconsistent with this result.35 It also agreed that no distinction was justified between lightning cases and tornado cases. Moreover,
it declined to evade the central issue by resort to the contact-with-thepremises exception, upon which the court below had relied. It traced
the evolution of "arising" cases in Michigan, with an exhaustive compilation of cases, including the increased-risk, street-risk, and on-thepremises cases, and concluded: "They have brought the law in Michigan to the point where it can be said today that if the employment is the
occasion of the injury, even though not the proximate cause, compensation should be paid."3 6
The court then traced the parallel evolution of the English and
Massachusetts cases from the proximate cause era to the positional-risk
era and placed Michigan firmly in the same company.
Brennan, C.J., dissented, joined by Dethmers, J., and Kelly, J., in
a brief and superficial opinion. The dissenters displayed as the centerpiece of their argument the equating of acts of God with privatelymotivated assaults:
An adulterous cobbler shot at his last by his jealous wife may be "in the
course of" his employment. But the injury does not "arise out of" the
job. On what basis of moral responsibility should his injuries be paid
for by his employer?...

If a workman is injured by some natural force such as lightning, the heat
of the sun, or extreme cold, which in itself has no kind of connection with employment, he cannot recover unless he can sufficiently associate such injury
with his employment. This he can do if he can show that the employment exposed him in a special degree to suffering such an injury. But if he is injured
by contact physically with some part of the place where he works, then, apart
from questions of his own misconduct, he at once associates the accident with
his employment and nothing further need be considered. So that if the roof
or walls fall upon him, or he slips upon the premises, there is no need to make
further inquiries as to why the accident happened. Per Lord Atkin. [1933]
A.C. at 677.
35. The court cited and overruled Kroon v. Kalamazoo County Rd. Comm'n, 339
Mich. 1, 62 N.W.2d 641 (1954); Nelson v. Country Club, 329 Mich. 479, 45 N.W.2d 362
(1951); Thier v. Widdifield, 210 Mich. 355, 175 N.W. 16 (1920); Klawinski v. Lake
Shore & Mich. S. Ry., 185 Mich. 643, 152 N.W. 213 (1915).
36. Whetro v. Awkerman, 383 Mich. 235, 243, 174 N.W.2d 783, 786 (1970).
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Lightning, flood, tornadoes and estranged wives will always be with
37
us, in this vale of tears.
The legal concepts in this dissent are as archaic as its cobbler example. Leaving aside the astonishing premise that workmen's compensation liability is based on the employer's "moral responsibility,"
one wonders how it is possible that in seventeen years the basic distinction between neutral risks like tornadoes, and personal risks like privately motivated assaults, can have failed to come to the attention of
3
three members of the Supreme Court of Michigan. 8
The "swing vote" in this historic decision was somewhat reluctantly cast by Black, J., who agreed in a concurring opinion that the result was right and that the overruled cases were "quite unsound," but
was troubled by the jolt to stare decisis represented by the overruling
of a long series of established decisions. He joined the majority, however, and cast his vote consistent with theirs, in order to produce a
working rule instead of having a court "fractured into indecisive
groups."
Stray bullets and flying debris
One of the early attempts to soften the traditional increased-risk
test took the form of the "street-risk" exception, which, in its most
advanced form, contributed the idea that a harm resulting from risks of
the street should be compensable whether or not this particular claimant's exposure to street risks was unusually great. In other words, if
the employment occasions the employee's use of the street, the risks of
the street are the risks of the employment, and, as was stated in the
leading case establishing this rule, Dennis v. A.J. White & Co.,3" "it is
quite immaterial whether the nature of the employment involves continuous or only occasional exposure to the dangers of the street."40
The street-risk doctrine, which originally grew up around perils
commonly associated with travel along the street, such as highway accidents and slips on icy sidewalks, has been expanded to include almost
any source of danger actually encountered in the street. In a case involving a chauffeur stabbed by a roving madman, the New York Court
of Appeals painted this Hogarthian picture of the city street and its
perils:
37. Id. at 244, 174 N.W.2d at 787.
38. The figure of seventeen years is based on the fact that the doctrine of "positional risk" as applied to and limited to "neutral risks" was first expounded in the
original edition of A. LmtsoN, THE Liw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1953).
39. [1917] A.C. 479 (H.L.).
40. Id. at 483.
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The street becomes a dangerous place when street brawlers, highwaymen, escaping criminals or violent madmen are afoot therein as they
sometimes are. The danger of being struck by them by accident is a
street risk because it is incident to passing through or being on the streetwhen dangerous characters are abroad.
Particularly on the crowded streets of a great city, not only do vehicles collide, pavements become out of repair and crowds jostle, but
mad or biting dogs may run wild, gunmen may discharge their weapons, police officers may shoot at fugitives fleeing from justice, or other
things may happen from which accidental injuries result to people on the
streets which are peculiar to the use of the streets and do not commonly
4
happen indoors. '
On this reasoning, the concept of street risk has been deemed
broad enough to include stray bullets, 2 a bomb dropped in Wall

Street,4 3 or even placed in a plane,4 4 portions of roofs or buildings fall41. Katz v. A. Kadans & Co., 232 N.Y. 420, 422, 134 N.E. 330, 331 (1922). Contra
Liebman v. Colonial Baking Co., 391 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965). Claimant was
employed as a delivery man for a bakery company. While making a delivery he was
assaulted by a drunken stranger. After a detailed discussion of assault rules and various street-risk theories, the court held that the fact that this assault occurred in the
street was merely incidental, and as a result the normal assault rule should apply, rather
than the street-hazard doctrine. Since this was a neutral assault, the injury was not
compensable.
42. Frigidaire Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 103 Cal. App. 27, 283 P. 974
(1929); Greenberg v. Voit, 250 N.Y. 543, 166 N.E. 318 (1929); Santos v. Guemes,
270 App. Div. 1057, 63 N.Y.S.2d 61, appeal denied, 296 N.Y. 1061, 69 N.E.2d 565
(1946).
The contra case of Borgeson v. Industrial Comm'n, 368 Ill. 188, 13 N.E.2d 164
(1938), in which a salesman was hit by a bullet directed by a man toward a woman and
in which it was held this was not a "risk or hazard of traffic or transportation," and
that "any loiterer there was exposed to the same risk," was disapproved in C.A. Dunham Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Ill. 2d 102, 156 N.E.2d 560 (1959), to the extent
that it held that street risks included only traffic and transportation hazards, and not
such risks as stray bullets and bombs.
The contra case of Lexington Ry. Sys. v. True, 276 Ky. 446, 124 S.W.2d 467
(1939), holding that the risk of a streetcar motorman being struck by a bullet fired by
a boy shooting at birds was not a risk peculiar to the street, was exp'ressly overruled
in Corken v. Corken Steel Prods., Inc., 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1965), in which compensation was awarded for the death of a salesman who was deliberately shot without
provocation by a stranger as the salesman was attempting to get back into his automobile to continue making calls on customers.
43. Roberts v. Newcomb & Co., 234 N.Y. 552, 138 N.E. 443 (1922).
44. C.A. Dunham Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Ill. 2d 102, 156 N.E.2d 560
(1959). The deceased was killed in an airplane crash which was caused by the explosion of a bomb placed aboard by the son of a passenger to collect insurance on his
mother's death. The court said that since the deceased's work required him to travel
by air, "the plane became the milieu of his employment, and the hazard of a plane
crash became a risk of that employment, to which decedent was subjected because of
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ing in a windstorm, 4 5 trees falling on the highway, 46 a shot by a sentry
whose challenge was not heard by a taxi driver, 47 a brick thrown by a
small boy,48 a stabbing by a lunatic, 49 a toy torpedo thrown by a child, °
and footballs 5 ' and baseballs52 flying into the street.
As the boundaries of the street-risk concept have been stretched
to embrace stray bullets, falling cornices, and homicidal maniacs, dissatisfaction has been felt with the artificiality of limiting such holdings
to mishaps whose situs happens to be a public street. It has been observed that injury from stray bullets in a public street may be compensable as a street risk. 3 In Auman v. Breckinridge Telephone Co., 4
however, the claimant was crossing not a public street but a vacant lot
between a garage and his office building when he was struck by a stray
bullet. The Minnesota court, citing and apparently accepting the New
York stray-bullet cases, nevertheless denied compensation on the technical ground that the vacant lot was not a public way and did not come
within the street-risk doctrine.
The best example of the impossibility of confining a principle of
liability in terms of an arbitrary situs such as the public street is seen
in the story of the New York stray-bullet cases. The risk of being hit
by stray bullets from the guns of gangsters, or of police pursuing fugifives, was listed as a "street risk" in Katz v. Kadans;55 and, although
we know from the cinema that gunmen may discharge their weapons
indoors as well as outdoors and that cops-and-robbers chases may take
place anywhere-inside buildings, over rooftops, through the sewers,
in and out of boudoirs, or through the frozen wilderness-still, one
might concede for the sake of argument that the risk of random bullets
the fact that he was directed to travel by plane." In another part of the opinion there
is language indicating that the claim could be sustained on the theory of street risk.
The death was held compensable.
45. Scandrett v. Industrial Comm'n, 235 Wis. 1, 291 N.W. 845 (1940).
46. Globe Indem. Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46 (1928), alf'd,
169 Ga. 510, 150 S.E. 849 (1929); Le Vasseur v. Allen Elec. Co., 338 Mich. 121, 61
N.W.2d 93 (1953).
47. Thorn v. Humm & Co., 112 L.T.R. (n.s.) 888 (1915).
48. Good v. City of Omaha, 125 Neb. 307, 250 N.W. 61 (1933).
49. Katz v. A. Kadans & Co., 232 N.Y. 420, 134 N.E. 330 (1922).
50. Town of Lindsay v. Sawyer, 156 Okla. 32, 9 P.2d 30 (1932).
51. Friel v. Industrial Comm'n, 398 Ill. 361, 75 N.E.2d 859 (1947). A football
shattered glass and injured a streetcar motorman.
52. Perkins v. Sprott, 207 N.C. 462, 177 S.E. 404 (1934). A baseball smashed
a windshield injuring a truck driver.
53. See note 42 supra.
54. 188 Minn. 256, 246 N.W. 889 (1933).
55. See note 41 supra.
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is somewhat greater in the street than elsewhere. But this "street risk"
did not remain out in the street. The first step was up the front steps,
when compensation was awarded for the death of a janitor who, while
sweeping the front stoop, was killed by random bullets from the car of
passing gangsters. 56 It then moved indoors, when a barber in the intenor of a building, hit by a stray bullet from a street fight, was
shop, being on the ground
granted compensation because the barber
7
floor, was exposed to such risks as this.5
So far, the street has been brought in the front door and as far as
the ground floor. For the time being, one can only wait until somebody sitting beside a second-floor window gets hit by a stray bullet
from the street, and, if the appropriate cases will arise, perhaps the
risks of the street can work their way up the side of the building as far as
the full range of side arms. Would the New York court be able to draw
distinctions between the ground floor, the second floor, and the twentieth floor, when everyone knows that stray bullets go up as well as
sideways?
In actual fact, New York has made several awards, usually in
memorandum decisions, for injuries by random bullets in which the
street-risk doctrine could not conceivably have been invoked. In the
Christiansen8 case, the deceased had made an appointment to meet a
man in a tavern on business. While waiting for him to arrive, deceased
was drinking at the bar. At this point a complete stranger began shooting at random in the barroom. With no reference to street risks or
any other special kind of risks, the court held this hazard to be a hazard
of the employment and awarded compensation, and leave to appeal
was denied by the highest court of New York. In three other cases,
employees have been struck by random accidental shots within their
own employer's buildings, in two instances by policemen, 9 and in one
by a third person,"0 and compensation has been consistently awarded.
Therefore, although New York has never in so many words announced
that it will not be confined to the street in stray-bullet cases, the record
speaks for itself, and shows awards for stray bullets encountered in de56. Greenberg v. Voit, 250 N.Y. 543, 166 N.E. 318 (1929).
57. Santos v. Guemes, 270 App. Div. 1057, 63 N.Y.S.2d 61, appeal denied, 296
N.Y. 1061, 69 N.E.2d 565 (1946).
58. Christiansen v. Hill Reprod. Co., 262 App. Div. 379, 29 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1941),
aff'd, 287 N.Y. 690, 39 N.E.2d 300 (1942).
59. Hall v. Feldman & Sons, 262 App. Div. 979, 30 N.Y.S.2d 70, appeal denied,
287 N.Y. 854, 38 N.E.2d 390 (1941); Entrocut v. Paramount Bakery & Rest. Co., 222
App. Div. 844, 226 N.Y.S. 808 (1928) (mem.).
60. Groppe v. J.C. Penney, 272 App. Div. 851, 70 N.Y.S.2d 173 (mem.), appeal
denied, 297 N.Y. 1035, 74 N.E.2d 486 (1948).

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW REVIEW

partment stores, 6' junkyard offices, 62 restaurants, 63 bars, 64 and barber

shops. 65
California, confronted with the identical problem, met it by discarding the street-versus-nonstreet distinction and adopting the posi-

tional-risk doctrine.

California had a background of precedents in

which compensability for stray bullets had turned on the difference be-

tween a locale such as a railway platform, 6 as against a ranch,
grove,68

7

an

restaurant.69

orange
or a
Occasionally an award had been
based on a theory that the nature of the work or setting increased the

random-bullet risk. Thus, such a danger was held obviously increased
for an employee whose duties consisted of patrolling a ranch for poachers and assisting in deer hunting.70 Much less obvious was the increased risk in the General Accident case. 71 In this case, the employee

was repairing tires in his employer's garage when an altercation broke
out between his employer and two customers.

The employer fired a

shot, apparently at one of the customers, which ricocheted and hit the
employee, who had taken no part whatever in the episode.

The court

justified its award with this comment:
[I]t can fairly be said that to some extent the risk of shooting, holdups, assaults, and the like has in recent years become so closely associ61. Id.
62. Hall v. Feldman & Sons, 262 App. Div. 979, 30 N.Y.S.2d 70, appeal denied,
287 N.Y. 854, 38 N.E.2d 390 (1941).
63. Entrocut v. Paramount Bakery & Rest. Co., 222 App. Div. 844, 226 N.Y.S. 808
(1928) (mem.).
64. Christiansen v. Hill Reprod. Co., 262 App. Div. 379, 29 N.Y.S.2d 24, alfd,
87 N.Y. 690, 39 l.E.2d 300 (1941).
65. Santos v. Guemes, 270 App. Div. 1057, 63 N.Y.S.2d 61, appeal denied, 296 N.Y.
1061, 69 N.E.2d 565 (1946). In the light of the general development of New York
doctrine in the causation area, the 1931 decision in Lebeda v. Pongracz, 230 App. Div.
606, 246 N.Y.S. 293, af!'d, 256 N.Y. 560, 177 N.E. 140 (1931), which denied compensatio'n to a watchman hit by a bullet fired by New Year's revelers whom he was
watching through the window, appears to be obsolete. The court relied on the specialrisk test, which has since been disavowed in New York.
66. Frigidaire Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 103 Cal. App. 27, 283 P. 974
(1929).
67. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 2d 292,
110 P.2d 676 (1941); cf. Trucks Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 147 Cal.
App. 2d 460, 305 P.2d 55 (1957), awarding compensation on similar facts in 1957,
jand indicating that the Associated Indemnity case had been overruled by a succession
of subsequent cases.
68. Hicks v. White, 18 I.A.C. 80.
69. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moon Chin, 12 I.A.C. 150.
70. O.L. Shafter Estate Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 175 Cal. 522, 166 P.
24 (1917).
71. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 186
Cal. 653, 200 P. 419 (1921).
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ated with the garage business72that it may be said that employment in
such an industry is hazardous.
Finally, in Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 3 California was faced with exactly the same decision that was
presented to New York in the Christiansen' case-what to do about a
random shot in a bar. The deceased, who, as co-manager of an inn,
sometimes relieved the bartender, was standing at the cash register with
her back to the bar when the wife of a customer walked in and fired a
shot which was evidently the culmination of an earlier quarrel. The
deceased was in no way involved, of course. The bullet ricocheted off
the bar and struck the deceased in the back. There was no evidence of
any prior shootings or disturbances in the bar. The opinion reviews
the various devices that had been used in the past to extend liability
without parting with earlier causation theories. For example, it observed that the General Accident75 reasoning could be pressed into service here: certainly if a garage is the kind of place where bullets may
be expected to fly, a bar is no less so. Or, again, the contact-with-thepremises idea could be exploited and extended. Here the court cited
explosion 70 and earthquake 77 cases that had relied on contact with the
premises, and concluded that the real substance of these decisions was
that the employment brought the employee into what became a position
of danger. However, said the court:
[I]f we desired to follow the specious reasoning in the cases which
place liability on the fact that the instrumentality of the employer was
the last one in the chain of circumstances leading to the employees injury, we could say that it was the bar, an instrumentality of the employer,
8
which caused the bullet to ricochet and strike Mrs. Baxter.7
Of course, the court knew that this would only be postponing the
inevitable decision, since some day, just as a windstorm, explosion, or
earthquake might cause injury without any contact with the premises, so
a bullet might strike an employee without ricocheting off the employer's property. Accordingly, the opinion swept aside all these dis72. Id. at 657, 200 P. at 421.
73. 95 Cal. App. 2d 805, 214 P.2d 41 (1950).
74. Christiansen v. Hill Reprod. Co., 262 App. Div. 379, 29 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1941),
af 'd, 287 N.Y. 690, 39 N.E.2d 300 (1942). See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
75. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
186 Cal. 653, 200 P. 419 (1921).
76. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 86 Cal. App. 2d 726, 195
P.2d 919 (1948).
77. Enterprise Dairy Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 202 Cal. 247, 259 P. 1099
(1927).

78. 95 Cal. App. 2d at 811-12, 214 P.2d at 46.
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tinctions and announced a simple formula: "It is only necessary to
hold that the death of Mrs. Baxter arose out of her employment because
her employment required her to be in what turned out to be a place of
'79
danger.
In New York, very nearly the same rule prevails. However, it is
characteristic of compensation law in New York that it is built up
largely not by long opinions of the Court of Appeals analyzing and coordinating controversial legal principles, but by hundreds of memorandum opinions dealing with the facts of particular cases. These must
be carefully pieced together in a sort of mosaic, before the pattern is
discernible.
The last time the Court of Appeals did any theorizing about the
present problem, it announced what might be called the zone-of-danger
theory. In the Filitti8 ° case, claimant, working in the open near the
-edge of his employer's property was struck by a falling piece of cornice
from a building on adjoining property. Compensatin was awarded on
the reasoning that the employment brought claimant into a "zone of
danger." The court had to distinguish the earlier McCarter case,s 1
which had denied compensation to an employee injured by the explosion of an old shell on neighboring property, and which at the same
time had explicitly rejected the positional-risk test. 82 It attempted to do
so by saying that the risk from the explosion was general, since the
fragments covered a wide area and imperilled many people, while in the
Filitti case there was a small and identifiable zone of danger.
The McCarter case seems to have been weakened considerably by
a subsequent case also involving an explosion on adjoining property. 83
This time, however, instead of a direct hit, there was a collapse of the
wall of the adjoining building, which fell onto the roof of the premises
where the employee was at work. The award was upheld by the Court
of Appeals in a memorandum opinion, on the authority of the Filitti
case, with no mention of the McCarter precedent. Apparently one
must conclude, after all, that the area within range of explosions on
79. Id. at 812, 214 P.2d at 46.
80. Filitti v. Lerode Homes Corp., 244 N.Y. 291, 155 N.E. 579 (1927).
81. McCarter v. LaRock, 240 N.Y. 282, 148 N.E. 523 (1925). A similar case
on the facts is Cennell v. Oscar Daniels Co., 203 Mich. 73, 168 N.W. 1009 (1918), denying compensation for injury due to explosion of refuse being dumped by the public
scavenger, since the dumping endangered the general public equally.
82. "[W]e have insisted that there must be some connection between accident
and employment other than a mere physical location of the employment which placed
him in the pathway of a cause producing injuries, no matter how or where that cause
originated." 240 N.Y. at 285, 148 N.E. at 524.
83. Malena v. Leff, 265 N.Y. 533, 193 N.E. 307 (1934).
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neighboring premises is a zone of danger. When, to this case, one adds
all the random-bullet cases in which awards have been obtained, it becomes evident that the net result in New York is very little different
84
from that in California under an avowed positional-risk theory.
New York fully accepts the actual-risk doctrine, and, in fact, was
probably the first to announce it in an exposure case.8 5 Now, it is a
very short step from the actual-risk to the positional-risk theory, if, in
determining the existence of actual risk, one takes a retrospective view.
If a stenographer is sitting by an open window on the third floor of a
business building, and is struck by a stray bullet, a court could, under
the actual-risk test, look back and conclude that, as the event itself
proved, the risk of stray bullets was indeed a risk of that employment.
This, after all, is precisely the process that took place when courts decided that random bullets were a risk of being a barber or a tire repair,man in a garage. Similarly, in the Filitti case, 6 one can look back at
the event and say, "Yes, as it turned out, that defective cornice was a
risk of this employment because it created a dangerous area." If this
can be said of a cornice, it can be said of any part of any building, inside
or out, or of any tree or structure whatever. In short, it can be said of
anything that hits an employee because his employment put him in its
path. Leaving aside, then, the distinction between big zones of danger
caused by explosions and such, and little zones of danger of a more
exclusive and private nature-a distinction which seems too arbitrary to
survive-one is driven to the conclusion that the New York zone-ofdanger theory, coupled with the state's actual-risk theory, adds up to
something very close to the positional-risk doctrine in actual practice.
The New York and California stories have been set out in full because they illustrate the entire process of starting to deal with a typical
"neutral" source of harm (stray bullets) by means of a fact-category
84. Several other assorted pieces of the New York mosaic may be mentioned,
which help to add up to a positional-risk pattern. In Webster v. Mason, 13 App. Div.
2d 355, 217 N.Y..S.2d 290 (1961), the employee died from a bee sting. The court did
not discuss the theory of risk involved, but merely cited Lepow v. Lepow Knitting
Mills, 288 N.Y. 377, 43 N.E.2d 450 (1942). The Lepow case, however, was based on
the increased-risk theory because the probability of malaria from a mosquito sting
was greater in South Africa. Similarly, an award was made for death from phlebitis
migrans from an insect bite in Richmond v. Mass & Birzt, 275 App. Div. 879, 88
N.Y.S.2d 682 (1949). See also Avis v. Electrolux Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 717, 151
N.Y.S.2d 542 (1956), in which a salesman's eye was injured by a flying owl's talon,
and Monahan v. Remington Rand, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 810, 192 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1959),
involving a falling tree.
85. See note 16 supra.
86. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
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doctrine (the street-risk doctrine), and ending with the necessity of
generalizing the causation principle involved.

Two other states, Massachusetts87 and Louisiana,8 8 have made
positional-risk awards in stray-bullet cases.

And New Jersey, as shown

at the outset, has clearly adopted.the positional-risk theory in an indistinguishable case, merely substituting a stray arrow for a stray bullet. 89
Enemy bombs

There could be no more stark example of a positional risk than the
blind destruction wrought by an enemy bomb. At this writing, the
continental United States fortunately has not had occasion to develop
any law on the subject, since its experience of enemy bombing has been
confined to a few Japanese balloon bombs and some desultory shelling
by submarines off the West coast, which do not appear to have pro-

duced any reported compensation claims.

The only bomb cases on

record are the so-called Wall Street explosion case, 90 involving a bomb
thrown into the street, and the Dunham case, 91 involving a bomb
planted in an airplane; as has already been related,9" the street-risk
doctrine was found sufficiently elastic to embrace these sources of in-

jury.
In England, however, there are several cases dating from the First
World War. The Second World War produced none, because this type

of injury was brought under the Personal Injuries Act of 1939, which
supplanted Workmen's Compensation as well as common-law liability
for war injuries.93 In a world which is never far from a state of war,
it may well be worthwhile to examine briefly such case law on the
subject as is available.
The English cases, which, it must be remembered, arose rather
early in the development of this branch of law, all required proof of
87. Baran's Case, 336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957). Compensation was
awarded to an employee who was unintentionally shot while leaving, but still on,
employer's premises at the close of the day's work, by a bullet fired by a fifteen-year
old engaging in aiming practice.
88. Williams v. United States Cas. Co., 145 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 1962), on facts
similar to those in Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 95 Cal. App. 2d
805, 214 P.2d 41 (1950).
89. Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 13 N.J. 8, 97 A.2d 593 (1953).
90. Roberts v. Newcomb & Co., 234 N.Y. 553, 138 N.E. 443 (1922).
91. C.A. Dunham Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Ill. 2d 102, 156 N.E.2d 560 (1959).
92. See notes 43-44 supra.
93. See 93 Law J. 133-134; 34 HALSBURY, LAWS Os ENGLAND 783-84 (2d ed.
Hailsham) (1940).
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special exposure of some kind. In Cooper v. North-Eastern Railway,
an engine driver, while in charge of his engine, was injured by German
bombardment of Hartlepool. Compensation was denied on the ground
that the fire was indiscriminate and that therefore injury resulted from
exposure common to all persons in the town. For the same reason,
compensation was denied to a collector in the street, 95 and to a potman
cleaning a door plate, 96 both injured by enemy bombs in the street. A
sufficient special risk was found where the workman's place of employment had a glass roof,9 7 and where a messenger was caught during
an errand in a warehouse in which, after a bomb hit, he was suffocated
98
by the smoke from inflammable materials stored there.
After the date of these decisions, the English causation rule was
greatly broadened until the positional-risk doctrine was firmly established. 99 So far as one can base a prediction on a dictum, it is a reasonable assumption that the Cooper case would today be decided differently, in view of the following statement by Slesser, L.J. in Powell v.
Great Western Railway:10 "This is a case of a man being, by reason of
his work, brought into a locality which was dangerous, . . . whether it
became dangerous after he got into the locality, by reason of someone
shooting at him, or dropping a bomb on the engine, or whatever it
might be, matters nothing."

Other neutral risks
A brief review of the cases leading up to this avowed acceptance
of the positional-risk doctrine will be useful both to show the pattern
taken by the gradual transition to this theory (which bears a striking resemblance to the New York story), and to provide at the same time
a survey of miscellaneous fact situations affected by this doctrine.
The story in England may well begin with Thorn v. Sinclair,' in
which a girl was injured by the fall of a wall on adjoining premises.
Lord Haldane enunciated the doctrine that any injury arose out of the
employment if "it was because of the nature, conditions, obligations or
incidents of the employment that the workman was brought within the
94. 32 T.L.R. 131 (1915).
95. Knyvett v. Wilkinson Bros., [1918] 87 L.J.K.B. 722.
96. Allcock v. Rogers, [1918] 118 L.T. 386 (H.L.).
97. Snaith v. Palmers Shipbuilding Co., unreported (H.L.).
98. Bird v. Keep [1918] 2 K.B. 692 (C.A.).
99. See text accompanying notes 100-07 infra.
100. [1940] 1 All E.R. 87 (C.A.) (emphasis added). See text accompanying note
106 infra.
101. [1917] 116 LT. 609 (H.L.).

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW REVIEW

zone of special danger."' 2 In Ailcock v. Rogers, °3 Lord Wrenbury,
refusing to apply the zone-of-special-danger test to an enemy bomb in
the street, admitted that the special danger did not have to be known,
but interpreted the phrase to refer to some inherent quality, such as
an adjoining insecure wall, which made the place more dangerous than
other places. This, then, seemed to require the existence of some kind
of structure making the place of employment dangerous. This interpretation was limited to the facts of that particular case by Lord Atkin's judgment for the House of Lords in the Brooker0 case.
In Lawrence v. George Matthews, Ltd.,1°5 a traveling man was
struck by a tree which just happened to fall during a gale as he passed
it on his motorcycle. Thorn v. Sinclair was much discussed in all the
opinions, some of the Justices evidently treating it as largely a contactwith-the-premises case. Lord Russell of Killowen, however, stressed
the zone-of-danger idea, and applied it to the area just under the tree,
adding that it was completely immaterial why the tree fell, if deceased's
employment brought him there. Here we still have a "structure," although one that fell not through inherent unsoundness.
It remained for Powell v. Great Western Railway' ° to remove this
last limitation and announce the positional or but-for rule in unqualified
terms. In that case, a locomotive engineer was injured when a youth
shot an airgun pellet at the locomotive and instead hit the engineer.
Slesser, L.J., relying principally on Thorn v. Sinclair, made the statement quoted above'
in connection with bombs, adding: "This man
suffered this casualty. . . and it arose out of the employment, because
he was at that place. It was by its very nature a place which was rendered dangerous by the shooting of the gun . . . .",
Goddard, L.J.,
put it in but-for terminology, and also ruled out any idea that the decision was based on the special temptation of shooting at locomotives,
when he said: "The fireman had to be there. If he had not been there,
he would never had been injured. . . . Therefore, I entirely fail to see
how it can be argued that his accident did not arise out of his employ102. Id. at 613.
103. [1918] 118 L.T. 386, 387 (H.L.).
104. Brooker v. Borthwick and Sons, [1933] A.C. 669. See note 34 supra.
105. [1929] 1 K.B. 1 (1928). Accord, Kaycee Coal Co. v. Short, 450 S.W.2d 262
(Ky. App. 1970). Decedent's truck was struck by a falling tree while he was traveling
between two parts of the employer's premises.

The death was held to be compen-

sable as a positional risk, since decedent's exposure was the result of his work.
106. [1940] 1 All E.R. 87 (C.A.).

107. Id. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
108. Id. at 89.
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ment, quite apart from the question of whether or not trains are an allurement to children. It seems to me that does not matter."'10 9
Among the other locality risks that have been explicitly dealt with
as such are hazards as diverse as runaway cars" 0 and falling kitchen
cabinets,"' as well as insects and birds," 2 already mentioned, and assaults by lunatics and children, and unexplained assaults and falls,
which will be taken up later.
Assaults of neutralorigin
The "neutral" category of assaults, associated with neither the
work environment nor the claimant's personal life, comprises those assaults which are in essence equivalent to blind or irrational forces, such
as attacks by lunatics, drunks, small children, and other irresponsibles;
completely unexplained assaults; and assaults by mistake. A minority
of jurisdictions are inclined to regard the neutral category as noncompensable, for want of affirmative proof of distinctive employment risk
as the cause of the harm; but a growing majority, sometimes expressly
applying the positional or but-for test, make awards for such injuries
when sustained in the course of employment.
Assaults by lunatics
The positional-risk issue is presented in its purest f6rm when some
lunatic or drunk wanders in from the outside world and assaults an
employee.
A number of courts have approached this type of risk by classifying it as a positional risk, comparable to the risk of random bullets or
lightning, since it is an irrational force which is apt to strike blindly
without discrimination between employee and nonemployee." 3 It is
109. Id. at 90.
110. In this instance, since the jurisdiction involved was consciously determined not
to accept the positional-risk doctrine in any guise, the result of this classification was a
denial of compensation. Lathrop v. Tobin-Hamilton Shoe Mfg. Co., 402 S.W.2d 16 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1966). Claimant was struck by a driverless runaway car which came
through a large window near the machine she operated. The court held that this was
not a street risk case, since the accident did not contribute to an increase in the hazard relative to the general public. The accident was classified as a positional risk, .and
compensation was denied.
111. Brooks v. Dee Realty Co., 72 N.J. Super. 499, 178 A.2d 644 (1962).
112. See note 84 supra. See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Williams, 378 S.W.2d 110
(Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Decedent was stung by a wasp. This resulted in a heart attack. the cause of death. Testimony was given that there were wasps on the premises,
and that several workers had been stung. Compensation was awarded.
113. Federal: Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hoage, 85 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir.
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interesting to trace an almost complete parallel between the lunatic-assault cases and stray-bullet cases, as they originate as extensions of the
street-risk doctrine, and are compelled eventually to burst open the factual boundaries imposed by that doctrine and expand into a principle

of general applicability.
In Katz v.A. Kadans & Co.,114 an attack by a roving lunatic who

was slashing at everyone in sight was held compensable because the
claimant was, by the nature of his job as chauffeur, exposed to the
"jostling crowds" of the city street, with the usual proportion of luna-

tics included. An indoor attack by a lunatic was certain to occur eventually somewhere, and presently such a case came before the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 115 The claimant, a chef, had

been stabbed by a roving madman who had found his way into the
restaurant kitchen.

The kitchen was not entirely secluded, since the

route to the washroom lay through it, but on the other hand it was a far
cry from the teeming crowds of the street.

In awarding compensa-

tion, the court relied at first on the locality-risk theory, when it said:
"[Tlhe claimant's injury arose out of his employment, because the terms

and conditions of his employment placed the claimant in the position
wherein he was assaulted . . . ."11 However, for good measure, it
later added that the analogy of street-risk cases applied because the
kitchen was in some degree accessible to the public.
1936). See text accompanying note 115 infra.
Colorado: London Guar. & Accident Co. v. McCoy, 97 Colo. 13, 45 P.2d 900
(1935). See text accompanying note 117 infra.
Hawaii: Asaeda v. Haraguchi, 37 Hawaii 556 (1947). See text accompanying
note 119 infra.
Idaho: Louie v. Bamboo Gardens, 67 Idaho 469, 185 P.2d 712 (1947). See text
accompanying note 120 infra.
Kentucky: Corken v. Corken Steel Prods., Inc., 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. App.
1964). Decedent, a salesman, was shot by an insane stranger while returning to his
car after lunch. The court, expressly approving the positional-risk test as generally
applicable, stated that for compensation purposes it was sufficient that the employment
caused the exposure. Compensation was awarded. Lexington Ry. System v. True, 276
Ky. 446, 124 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. App. 1939) was overruled.
Texas: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hampton, 414 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
Decedent was killed as he left his place of employment with a fellow-employee. The
shooting was done by a mentally ill cousin of the other employee, and was the result
of a grudge held by the cousin against the other employee. Decedent merely happened to
be at the scene when the incident occurred.. The court held that the sole reason for decedent's contact with the killer was the employment, and that therefore the death was
compensable.
114. 232 N.Y. 420, 134 N.E. 330 (1922).
115. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hoage, 85 F,2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
116. Id. at 418.

THE POSITIONAL-RISK DOCTRINE

But suppose not even this could be said. Suppose the attack occurred in a private home. Would the New York or District of Columbia courts award compensation? The question will some day have to
be faced, as it was by the Colorado Supreme Court in London Guarantee
& Accident Co. v. McCoy." 7 There, a sales agent in the course of a
business trip stopped in at a friend's home to make a necessary business
phone call. At just this moment, his friend's father-in-law had one of
his rare attacks of homicidal mania, and attacked not only claimant but
his wife and daughters. The death was held compensable, not on any
fiction or analogy of street risks, but simply on the ground that the
duties of his employment had placed claimant in that place at that
particular time when the assailant happened to have his onset of criminal
mania. Colorado had precedent for this theory going back to its 1927
lightning case." 8
The same reasoning was adopted by the Supreme Court of Hawaii
in Asaeda v. Haraguchi,"9 in which the locale of the lunatic's assault
was the yard of a residence where the claimant, a house painter, was
eating his lunch. Compensation was awarded on the ground that the
employment brought claimant to the place of danger, athough it was
only in retrospect that it could be seen to have been a place of danger,
due to human agencies that could not have been foreseen or expected.
The Supreme Court of Idaho has also adopted this view, and may
indeed have carried it a step further, by extending it to a delusion
which makes the madman seek out this particular victim, rather than
kill indiscriminately. In Louie v. Bamboo Gardens,2 ' Hong had the
idea that members of a tong to which Louie belonged were seeking to
kill Hong because the tong thought Hong had turned state's evidence
on a narcotics charge. Hong was wrong about the tong; in fact, the
whole thing was an insane obsession. But Hong came into the restaurant where Louie worked and shot three times, one shot striking Louie.
The court, in reversing an award denying compensation, first said that
there was no evidence that Hong was particularly looking for Louie,
but added:
It may, however, be of no significance as to whether or not said
Hong was looking for Tom Louie at the time he shot him and had either
a real or imaginary grievance against him. The fact remains that it was
an accidental injury and under the Workmen's Compensation Law,
117.
118.
119.
120.

9TColo. 13, 45 P.2d 900 (1935).
See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Colo. 233, 254 P. 995 (1927).
37 Hawaii 556 (1947).
67 Idaho 469, 185 P.2d 712 (1947).
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claimant and appellant is entitled to receive compensation as a result of
121
said injury.
The court relied heavily on the luiatic-assault cases from the District of Columbia 2 2 and Colorado, 2 ' and concluded:
[T]he injury was the result of a risk to which appellant was subjected in the course of his employment, and to which he would not have
been subjected had he not been so employed. . . . It was his employment that placed him in the position and environment wherein he was
24
assaulted and sustained the accidental injury.
There are several contra cases, however, including one or two
fairly recent ones. 1 25 For example, in a Tennessee case,' 26 a traveling
man who was waiting for his lunch in a restaurant along the way was
subjected to an unexpected and unprovoked attack by a lunatic or
drunk. The court denied compensation, asserting that there was no
distinction between assaults made by mentally responsible and mentally
irresponsible strangers, since neither had any origin in the employment.
Similarly, in a plainly erroneous Maine case,"2 7 a foreman who worked
on the evening shift heard a shot and went to the gate to investigate.
As he stepped into the darkness he was deliberately shot by a crazed
soldier. The court first examined the question whether the foreman
was technically performing his duties while investigating the disturbance, and concluded he was not, since "it was not incumbent on him"
to make such investigations. The court then scrutinized the reasonableness of his conduct, saying, "it does not appear that he, entirely unarmed, could perform any useful service. . . . He went out, utterly
defenseless .
...
128 and so on. Compensation was therefore denied.
121. Id. at 474, 185 P.2d at 714.
122. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hoage, 85 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
123. London Guar. & Accident Co. v. McCoy, 97 Colo. 13, 45 P.2d 900 (1935).
124. 67 Idaho at 483, 185 P.2d at 716.
125. Illinois: Belden Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 44 Ill. 2d 253, 255 N.E.2d 439
(1970). Decedent was shot by the insane husband of a maid employed at a rooming
house in which decedent allegedly worked. Although the court also affirmed a ruling
that decedent was not an employee, it further indicated that decedent's death was the
result of the insane jealousy of his attacker, and did not arise out of the employment.
Maine: Hawkins v. Portland Gas Light Co., 141 Me. 288, 43 A.2d 718 (1945).
See text accompanying note 127 infra.
Oklahoma: Graham v. Graham, 390 P.2d 892 (Okla. 1964). The husband of a
co-worker entered the cafe and shot his wife, the claimant's husband, and a customer.
The incident was attributed to the assailant's mental condition rather than any employment factors. Compensation denied.
Tennessee: Thornton v. R.C.A. Serv. Co., 188 Tenn. 644, 221 S.W.2d 954 (1949).
See text accompanying note 126 infra.
126. Thornton v. R.C.A. Serv. Co., 188 Tenn. 644, 221 S.W.2d 954 (1949).
127. Hawkins v. Portland Gas Light Co., 141 Me. 288, 43 A.2d 718 (1945).
128. Id. at 293, 43 A.2d at 720.
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Assaults by children
Intentional assaults by children usually take the form of throwing
things, and it is probably not unfair to the children to classify their

childish depredations with such other positional risks as lunatics, mad
dogs, and hurricanes.

In fact, the first clear enunciation of the posi-

tional-risk doctrine occurred in the English case, already mentioned,' 29
which awarded compensation to the locomotive fireman who was hit by
a pellet aimed at the locomotive by a boy with an air gun. New York
in 1926 denied compensation to an employee who was hit in the eye
by a piece of wire thrown by a youthful trespasser from adjoining property; 130 but this case must be read in the light of the subsequent New
York cases, discussed earlier, involving other irrational forces such as

falling cornices, stray bullets, and homicidal maniacs.
Unexplained assaults

Occasionally an assault occurs for which no explanation whatever
appears, either because the assault was unwitnessed, or because, even
with all the facts available, no one can figure out why the assault was
committed. Nothing connects it with the victim privately; neither can

it be shown to have had a specific employment origin. If the claimant
is in fact exposed to that assault because he is discharging his duties at
that time and place, there is no better reason here than in the unex129. Powell v. Great Western Ry., [1940] 1 All E.R. 87 (C.A.). See text accompanying notes 100, 109 supra. Accord, Challis v. London & S.W. Ry., [1905] 2 K.B.
154 (C.A.). In the Challis case there was some reliance on the particular attractiveness of locomotives as juvenile targets, but in the Powell case this consideration was expressly disavowed as a concurrent ground for the decision. 1 All E.R. at 90 (MacKinnon, L.J., concurring). See text accompanying note 109 supra.
130. Isabelle v. J.H. Bode & Co., 215 App. Div. 184, 213 N.Y.S. 185 (1926). But see
Town of Lindsay v. Sawyer, 156 Okla. 32, 9 P.2d 30 (1932), in which a city employee
who was normally engaged in hazardous employment was injured while engaged in
conversation with one of the city's suppliers by the explosion of a torpedo thrown by
a small boy. Recovery was allowed. See also Gregory v. Lewis Sales Co., 348 S.W.2d
743 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961). A furniture salesman suffered the indignity and subsequent
injury of having a chair pulled out from under him just as he was about to sit down.
The prafikster was a local newsboy who had come into the store from the street. There
was no evidence that the newsboy and the salesman had previously engaged in such
byplay, and in fact, the claimant based his case on assault rather than on horseplay.
The court denied the claim on the ground that, while the injuries occurred during the
course of employment, they did not arise out of the employment. The "assault" was
totally unconnected to the duties of his employment, to any particular hazards of the
employment or to any natural and reasonable incident of the employment. Compensation was denied. Note that this Missouri court is consciously and almost aggressively opposed to the positional-risk doctrine. See note 110 supra.
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plained-fall or death cases, discussed later,13' to deny an award merely
because claimant cannot positively show that the assault was motivated

by something connected with the work. Although the cases are more
evenly divided on unexplained assaults than on unexplained falls or

deaths, there is now a demonstrably larger body of authority for award-

1 33
ing compensation' 32 on these facts than for denying it.

131. See notes 176-218 infra and accompanying text.
132. Federal: Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Johnson, 148 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1945).
See text accompanying note 134 infra.
Idaho: Mayo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161, 457 P.2d 400 (1969). Decedent, a store manager, was beaten to death by an employee who then committed
suicide. No explanation was given for the attack. Because of the absence of a showing
of either a personal or work-connected reason for the attack, the death was held to result from neutral causes, and the court held that under these circumstances a rebuttable
presumption of compensability was presented, and since the employer did not present
evidence that the death was from a personal risk, death benefits were properly
awarded. Wells v. Robinson Constr., 52 Idaho 562, 16 P.2d 1059 (1932), was overruled.
Kentucky: Coomes v. Robertson Lumber Co., 427 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. App. 1968).
Claimant was seen unloading lumber from a truck, and shortly thereafter was found
by the truck dazed and bleeding from a head wound. There were no witnesses to the
incident, and because of the consequences of the injury, claimant was not able to explain what had happened. The court reversed a denial of compensation benefits. Contra, Stapleton v. Fork Junction Coal Co., 247 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. App. 1952), denying compensation to a night watchman who was assaulted while asleep. There was some indication that employee could have told more than he did.
Massachusetts: McLean's Case, 323 Mass. 35, 80 N.E.2d 40 (194B). See text accompanying note 135 infra.
Minnesota: See Gagne v. Oreck, 266 Minn. 1, 122 N.W.2d 589 (1963), in which
the compensability of an unexplained assault on the premises depended upon whether
the claimant was performing employment duties or was on a personal mission at the
time.
New Mexico: Ensley v. Grace, 76 N.M. 691, 417 P.2d 885 (1966). Decedent, a
bookkeeper, was shot by a co-employee, who then took his own life. The murder was
unwitnessed, and there was no evidence as to its cause. Since the decedent was at
work, these facts were held sufficient to raise a presumption that her death was compensable. Compensation was awarded.
New York: Valenti v. Valenti, 28 App. Div. 2d 572, 279 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1967).
Decedent, a restaurant manager, was shot by a customer. There was no reason
given for the killing. The court held that there was no evidence to overcome the presumption of compensability. Compensation was awarded. See Fox v. Carpenters Local 606, 33 App. Div. 2d 605, 304 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1969). Decedent, a union business
agent, was assaulted and fatally beaten. There was testimony that there was ill feeling
and tension within the union, and that the assailant might have been a certain individual whose motives were related to union business. Evidence held sufficient to support the conclusion that the attack was work-connected, even though the assailant was
not positively identified. Award of death benefits affirmed.
North Dakota: Lippman v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 79
N.D. 248, 55 N.W.2d 453 (1952). Compensation was awarded to a waitress who was
shot by a customer who immediately killed himself. The motive was unknown.
Oklahoma: B & B Nursing Home v. Blair, 496 P.2d 795 (Okla. 1972). Claimant
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In Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Johnson,1
the deceased was
a Negro employee who was shot while on a loading platform of the em-

ployer by an unknown occupant of a car who drove onto the premises
and deliberately shot him. The assailant was a complete stranger, and
there was no personal motive; in short, the assault was completely unexplained. The defense suggested a connection with a race riot then in

progress in a different part of town, but deceased knew nothing of this
and had taken no part in it. An award of compensation was affirmed
by the federal court applying Texas law.
McLean's Case' 35 brings the prestige of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts to the support of this view. Here a taxi driver was
found viciously beaten from behind with a hammer. He had not been
robbed, although he had thirty-six dollars in his wallet. There was no
was employed in a nursing home, and was attacked and beaten by an unknown assailant
when she entered the laundry room at 3:00 a.m. There was no direct evidence as to
the motive for the assault, and claimant was neither robbed nor sexually assaulted.
Adopting the rationale here favored as to unexplained assaults, the court held that an
award of benefits was proper. The court said flatly: "If the injured party is actually
on the job working in the course of his employment for the employer at the time the
assault occurred, he is entitled to compensation benefits, although the assailant may
be unknown, and the cause of the assault is not directly related to the business of the
employer." 496 P.2d at 797.
133. Colorado: Rocky Mtn. Fuel Co. v. Kruzic, 94 Colo. 398, 30 P.2d 868 (1934).
But see text accompanying notes 137-38 infra.
Georgia: Francis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 95 Ga. 225, 97 S.E.2d 553 (1957),
involving an unexplained shooting of an employee by a neighbor while the employee was entering the post office to get the employer's mail.
Illinois: Math Igler's Casino, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 394 Ill. 330, 68 N.E.2d
773 (1946). See text accompanying note 139 infra.
Kansas: Siebert v. Hock, 199 Kan. 299, 428 P.2d 825 (1967). Decedent had
been employed as general manager of a dairy, and because he worked late hours had
been permitted to rest on a couch located in the office. He was found shot to death,
the shooting having occurred between midnight and 2:00 a.m. Nothing was stolen,
although decedent had $100 cash, and the dairy receipts were in the safe. Several days
prior to his death decedent had beaten his wife, after wlich she had left him. His
brother had become angry at him, and there was evidence that the brother was in love
with decedent's wife. The shooting was done with a .22, and decedent's .22 was missig from his car and was never found. Six months later the office safe was opened
and robbed. The court held that from the facts stated it was improper to infer that
decedent was killed in the course of a burglary, and therefore the death was not compensable.
Missouri: Toole v. Bechtel Corp., 291 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1956), involving an
unexplained shooting by a co-employee at lunch time. See Kelly v. Sohio Chem. Co.,
392 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. 1965). Claimant was struck on the head by an unknown assailant
while at work. There was no indication why the assault was made. The court denied
compensation, aff'g 383 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
134. 148 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1945).
135. 323 Mass. 35, 80 N.E.2d 40 (1948).
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explanation whatever of the assault, which might have had a private as
well as an occupational origin. Compensation was awarded, on the
simple ground that the "employment brought him in contact with the
risk that in fact caused his injuries. ' 13 6
Several cases that have arisen on similar facts have denied recovery. A Colorado case, 137 while on its facts a clear denial of compensation for an unexplained assault, is of dubious value now in indicating
the general causation principles in force in Colorado, in view of the
avowed adoption of the positional-risk test in the case of the assault on

a traveling man by a lunatic in a private home where the traveling man

13
had gone to make a phone call.

Another contra decision was handed down by the Supreme Court
of Illinois in 1946. s3 Here claimant and assailant worked in the same
kitchen. Shortly after claimant's arrival at work, accompanied by cordial greetings to assailant, who was on friendly terms with the claimant,
the assailant, with no word and no explanation, walked over to claimant and struck him in the eye with a ladle, blinding one eye. The assailant then walked out without comment, and never came back. The

Supreme Court reversed the award given by the commission and lower
court, on the ground that the claimant had not affirmatively proved that
the assault grew out of a risk peculiar to the nature of the employment.
Claimant should be given the benefit of the rules applicable to unexplained assaults and deaths not only when the assault is unwitnessed

but also when, though witnessed, its motive and character are inexpliIn
cable. This point was slighted in Giles v. W.E. Beverage Corp.'
136. Id. at 38, 80 N.E.2d at 43.
137. Rocky Mtn. Fuel Co. v. Kruzic, 94 Colo. 398, 30 P.2d 868 (1934).
138. London Guar. & Accident Co. v. McCoy, 97 Colo. 13, 45 P.2d 900 (1935). But
cf. Miller v. Denver Post, 137 Colo. 61, 322 P.2d 661 (1958), denying compensation
to a newsboy injured by a fellow-carrier in the course of a chase to retrieve a radio
aerial taken from his bicycle.
139. Math Igler's Casino, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 394 Ill. 330, 68 N.E.2d 773
(1946).
A subsequent Illinois case with remarkably similar facts reached the same result.
American Brake Shoe Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 20 Ill. 2d 132, 169 N.E.2d 256 (1960).
A co-employee came up behind claimant, threw him to the ground fracturing his ankle, and walked away-all without saying a word. Compensation was denied.
140. 133 N.J.L. 137, 43 A.2d 286 (1945), aff'd, 134 N.J.L. 234, 46 A.2d 728
(1946).
In Everts v. Jorgensen, 227 Iowa 818, 289 N.W. 11 (1939), compensation was
awarded the victim of a witnessed but inexplicable assault; but the discussion concerned
largely the effect of a statutory exclusion of injuries due to assaults for personal reasons.
The employer contended that the claimant had the burden of proving that the assault
was not based on personal grounds. The court rejected this contention, placing the
burden of proving the assault a privately motivated one on the employer asserting the
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that case a liquor store employee was shot and killed by two men for
unknown reasons. No money was stolen, and the assailants were seen
but not recognized. Claimant relied in part on the presumption that
when unexplained death occurs in the course of employment it arises
out of the employment. The court replied that this principle was inapplicable because "here there is no lack of evidence as to how Giles
suffered death.' 141 The Supreme Court of New Jersey evidently failed
to see that the identical principle pervades both unexplained and unwitnessed assaults. Certainly, there was evidence of how death occurred, just as there is in almost every unexplained death case-by
shooting, by beating, by falls down elevator shafts, and the like. The
"how" is not the crucial issue; the crucial issue is the "why", and the
"why" is just as obscure in a witnessed but completely inexplicable assault, fall, or death as it is in an unwitnessed one.
Intentionalassaults by mistake or in a melee
Shootings by mistake or in a general melee resemble in principle the
previous illustrations of irrational and unexplained assault. A good
factual illustration is supplied by Harbroe'sCase, 4 ' although it is inconceivable, in the light of the subsequent development of Massachusetts
compensation doctrine, 14 3 that the case would be followed today. A
night watchman was killed on duty under the following circumstances:
A deputy sheriff in pursuit of burglars mistook the watchman for one of
the burglars, while the watchman made the same mistake as to the
deputy. In the resulting exchange of shots the watchman was killed.
The decision was based on the following premise: "It cannot reasonably
be said that the risk of being shot by trespassing lawbreakers is incidental
to or has its origin in the nature of a night watchman's ordinary employment." 44 This extraordinary view is, of course, now discredited by the
virtually universal holding that the risk of such assault is an inherent
part of the job of being a night watchman. 145 An Illinois case that
resembles Harbroe's Case both in its facts and in its reasoning is Sure
exclusion. The court began by saying that there was no doubt that the injury arose out
of the employment, thus confining the controversy to the incidence of the burden of
proof under the statutory exclusion.
141. 133 N.J.L. at 139, 43 A.2d at 288.
142. 223 Mass. 139, 111 N.E. 709 (1916).
143. See McLean's Case, 323 Mass. 35, 80 N.E.2d 40 (1948). Indeed, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts has said that Harbroe's Case "cannot be accepted as
stating the present law of this Commonwealth." In re Baran's Case, 336 Mass. 342,
343, 145 N.E.2d 726, 727 (1957).
144. 223 Mass. at 141, 11 N.E. at 711.
145.

(1972)..

See 1 A. LARsoN, THE LAw oF WoaRnvM's COMPENSATION, §§ 11.ll(a)-(b)
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Pure Ice Co. v. Industrial Commission.14

Here a night employee was

shot by policemen who mistook him for a thief for whom they were
looking, after he had disregarded their order to halt, and compensation
was denied.

These early cases are out of line with the majority rule, which
holds that intentional but mistaken assaults upon innocent victims in
the course of their employment are deemed to arise out of the employ147

ment.
Illinois itself has more recently made an award, because of the
special circumstances, to the victim of a mistaken shooting. In Scott v.
Industrial Commission, 48 the employer had posted officers to protect
his property from sabotage by strikers, and deceased, who had been
sent by his employer to an island so guarded, at a time when the em-

ployer had undertaken to protect his employees from strikers, was
shot by the guards when he tried to land. Compensation was awarded.
Colorado provides another example of an award based on mistaken

assault. 149 A salesman was taking a demonstration car to a friend's
commercial garage so as not to leave it exposed to frost during the night.
The salesman had earlier been in business with this friend, and still had
a key to the garage. As he was letting himself in, his friend, who had

been lying in wait for burglars, mistook him for a burglar and shot him.
Compensation was awarded, since the employment exposed deceased
to this injury,0 and "the injury would not have occurred but for the em15
ployment."'
An example of the analogous situation of shootings in a general
146. 320 Ill. 332, 150 N.E. 909 (1926).
147. California: Atolia Mining Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 175 Cal. 691, 167
P. 148 (1917), awarding compensation to a miner who was mistakenly shot by the employer's own mine guards without adequate investigation.
Colorado: Industrial Comm'n v. Ernest Irvine, Inc., 72 Colo. 573, 212 P. 829
(1923). See text accompanying note 149 infra.
Illinois: Scott v. Industrial Comm'n, 374 I1. 225, 29 N.E.2d 93 (1940). See
text accompanying note 148 infra.
Minnesota: Wold v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 147 Minn. 17, 179 N.W. 219 (1920),
awarding compensation to an automobile salesman shot by a posse when he was mistaken for an auto thief.
Apparently contra:
Ohio: Jamison v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 Ohio App. 404, 56 N.E.2d 515 (1943),
denying compensation in a mistaken shooting, is based on its special facts. A watchman had brought his wife along to stay with him during his watch, and during the watch
she shot him thinking he was a prowler. The theory was that the watchman "created
his own hazard" by bringing along his wife.
148. 374 Il. 225, 29 N.E.2d 93 (1940).
149. Industrial Comm'n v. Ernest Irvine, Inc., 72 Colo. 573, 212 P. 829 (1923).
150. Id. at 576, 212 P. at 832.
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melee is an Alabama casel which presented the following facts: The
deceased, while "on call" as an electrician, was standing near a payroll
line when an argument developed between a company policeman and
another employee named Carter. Presently Carter and his brother produced pistols, and in the ensuing shooting, while a whole roomful of
men were scurrying for cover, deceased ran into Carter, who turned
and intentionally shot deceased. There was no personal quarrel of any
kind between deceased and Carter; Carter evidently thought thaf deceased was attempting to interfere with or restrain him. Compensation
was denied on the theory that Carter's motivation at that instant was
unconnected with anything having to do with the employment, being
rather "blind, angry resentment" and therefore "purely personal in its
conception and performance." There are several possible criticisms of
this decision, one or two of which may be mentioned. For one thing,
the court should have looked behind the blind resentment and asked
what the character of the affray was that produced it; it was, of course,
purely occupational, as the court conceded on the rehearing, when it
admitted that the case would be different if the company policeman
were the claimant. For another thing, the case could easily have been
decided in claimant's favor on the simple theory that he was protecting
the employer's interest by preventing harm, for which the employer
would have been liable in compensation, to the company policeman,
since, as the court stated, the assault may have been a "defensive measure to prevent any further interference by Harris or others with the
Carters' assault upon Tarwater."
It will be observed that there is only a fine line between mistaken
assaults, general melees and mixups, assaults by lunatics and drunks,
unexplained assaults, and injury by random bullets. The random-bullet cases differ only in that the bullet was not deliberately aimed at the
employee. But in every case the force that sends the bullet in its fatal
direction is irrational, that is, it is a force that is specially concerned
neither with the victim's private life nor with his employment status.
Only one thing can be said with assurance: The injury would not have
occurred except for the obligations of the employment; and if this test
of causation is acceptable to a court for one of these types of cases, it
should be equally acceptable for the rest.
Assault produced by friction and strain of employment
Up to this point, the assaults grouped together for positional-risk
151. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Harris, 218 Ala. 130, 117 S6. 755, rehearing
denied, 222 Ala. 470, 132 So. 727 (1931).
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purposes have been clearly "neutral" in the sense that they contained no
component of personal animosity deliberately directed at this particular

victim. When this cannot be said, some additional considerations and
distinctions come into play.
At one extreme, it is well settled that, when the combatants have
some kind of personal feud growing out of their private lives, such as
quarrels about wives or girl friends, the fact that it erupts into an as-

sault on the working premises during working hours does not make it
compensable. 15 2

On the other hand, an assault consciously aimed at

a co-employee in a burst of personal anger is equally clearly compensable if the dispute itself was distinctly work-connected, as when a worker

assaults a foreman who has reprimanded him about his work performance. 15 3 The development relevant to the present analysis of the positional-risk doctrine occurred when Justice Rutledge, in the Hartford
Accident case,' 54 carried the concept of work-connected assaults one
152. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 11.21 (1972).
153. Id. § 11.12.
154. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940).
Accord:
Arkansas: Townsend Paneling, Inc. v. Butler, 247 Ark. 818, 448 S.W.2d 347
(1970). A fellow employee offered to make a bet with claimant while they were working, and in response claimant told him that he was not interested and that the other
employee should attend to his work. A few minutes later claimant was struck by the
other employee. Affirming the general rule that to be compensable an assault must be
related to the employment, the court held that an award of benefits to claimant was
proper. Contra, Birchett v. Tuf-Nut Garment Mfg. Co., 205 Ark. 483, 169 S.W.2d 574
(1943), where a contra result was reached in a case involving a scuffle over a newspaper. The Birchett case was discredited in Southern Cotton Oil Div. v. Childress, 237
Ark. 909, 377 S.W.2d 167 (1964).
Georgia: Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Coney, 102 Ga. App. 155, 115 S.E.2d 633
(1960). See text accompanying note 162 infra.
Louisiana: Velotta v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 241 La. 814, 132 So. 2d 51 (1961)
(involving facts strikingly similar to those in Hartford Accident--even to the nickname); Milton v. T.J. Moss Tie Co., 20 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 1944).
Mississippi: Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. CO. v. Pittman, 214 Miss. 823, 59
So. 2d 547 (1952), holding an inexplicably violent assault by a co-employee after a
trivial exchange compensable.
New Jersey: Crotty v. Driver Harris Co., 49 N.J. Super. 60, 139 A.2d 126 (1958).
See text accompanying note 165 infra.
New York: Bennett v. Dreier Structural Steel Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 178, 186
N.Y.S.2d 776 (1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 668, 212 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1961) (holding an assault
by a co-employee on claimant, a known psychotic, after a gross insult by claimant, compensable); Katz v. Reissman Rothman Corp., 261 App. Div. 862, 24 N.Y.S.2d 807
(1941).
Oklahoma: Mullins v. Tanksleary, 376 P.2d 590 (Okla. 1962). The claimant
asked Dan Chupp, "Say, Dubby, where do you want this sheetrock stacked?" Mr.
Chupp thought the claimant had said "Dopey" or "Dummy" and hit him in the face.
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step further by holding that, even if the subject of the dispute is unrelated to the work, the assault is compensable if "the work of the participants brought them together and created the relations and conditions
which resulted in the clash."' '
A warehouse checker's helper, driven
to desperation by being constantly called Shorty, finally called his superior a vile name, and was immediately knocked down, receiving the
injuries for which compensation was claimed. Here there was no work
dispute; 156 neither was there personal enmity, in the sense that the
The court held that the spontaneous assault, unrelated to employment and unrelated to
personal animosity, "lay within that range of work-connected peril which was inseparable from the risk incidental to the employment." Id. at 592.
South Dakota: Anderson v. Hotel Cataract, 70 S.D. 376, 17 N.W.2d 913 (1945).
See text accompanying note 163 infra.
Wisconsin: Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 266 Wis. 81, 62 N.W.2d
567 (1954). See text accompanying note 160 infra.
155. 112F.2d at 18.
156. The friction-and-strain doctrine enunciated by Justice Rutledge has been rejected by some courts, which continue to treat a quarrel as private unless the subject
of the quarrel is related to the work. For example, in Willis v. Taylor & Fenn Co.,
137 Conn. 626, 79 A.2d 821 (1951), the claimant found some offensive language
written in his locker, and accused a co-employee of its authorship. An argument ensued; claimant reached for something in his pocket which the co-employee thought was
a knife; and the co-employee hit claimant with a rakn. The Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut in 1951 reaffirmed its 1918 statement in Jacquemin v. Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co., 92 Conn. 382, 384, 103 A. 115, 116 (1918), that:
[i]f one employe assaults another employe solely to gratify his feeling
of anger or hatred, the injury results from the voluntary act of the assailant, and cannot be said to arise either directly out of the employment or
as an incident of it. But when the employe is assaulted while he is defending his employer, or his employer's property, or his employer's interests,
or when the assault was incidental to some duty of his employment, the injuries
he suffers in consequence of the assault will, as a rule, arise out of the employment.
The court goes on, still quoting from the earlier case, in effect to reject Justice Rutledge's view:
The fact that employes sometimes quarrel and fight while at work
does not make the injury which may result one which arises out of their employment. There must be some reasonable connection between the injury suffered and the employment or the conditions under which it is pursued. 92
Conn. 382, 387, 103 A. 115, 116.
Missouri has also expressly held that it cannot take the broad Rutledge view under its statute. Thus, compensation was denied to the widow of a worker who was killed
by a coemployee over an argument about stealing wine brought to the premises, in
Lardge v. Concrete Prod. Mfg. Co., 251 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. 1952), and even to the innocent
victim of a stray bullet fired by one co-employee at another co-employee over a quarrel about who found a five-cent piece, in Long v. Schultz Shoe Co., 257 S.W.2d 211
(Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
Several other states have also resisted the trend toward the friction-and-strain rule.
See Martin v. Sloss-Sheffield Iron & Steel Co., 216 Ala. 500, 113 So. 2d 578 (1957);
Huddleston v. Industrial Comm'n, 271 Ill. 2d 446, 189 N.E.2d 353 (1963); Jones v.
Schiek's Cafe, 277 Minn. 273, 152 N.W.2d 356 (1967); Fautheree v. Insulation &
Specialities, Inc., 67 N.M. 230, 354 P.2d 526 (1960); Davis v. Industrial Comm'n,
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animosity was imported by the participants from the realm of their private lives. The reason for the decision is best given in Justice Rutledge's own expressive language:
This view recognizes that work places men under strains and fatigue from human and mechanical impacts, creating frictions which explode in myriads of ways, only some of which are immediately relevant
to their tasks. Personal animosities are created by working together on
the assembly line or in traffic. Others initiated outside the job are magnified to the breaking point by its compelled contacts. No worker is immune to these pressures and impacts upon temperament. They accumulate and explode over incidents trivial and important, personal and official. But the explosion point is merely the culmination of the antecedent
pressures. That it is not relevant to the immediate task, involves a lapse
from duty, or contains an element of volition or illegality does not disconnor nullify their causal effect in producing its injurious
nect it from them
57
consequences.1
Justice Rutledge's word picture conjures up a mental image of a
noisy, frantic environment, with exasperated workmen jostling and
bumping as they make their hurried way between screaming lathes and
slamming presses. But one wonders if an equally explosive pressure
might not be built up between a receptionist and stenographer glaring
day after day at each other in the carpeted stillness of a Wall Street law
office. The essence of the decision, then, seems to be the enforced
bringing-together, rather than any outward trappings producing nerve
strain.
This view is supported by the fact that Justice Rutledge drew heavily upon positional-risk cases to support the decision. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals had already accepted the positional doctrine in cases involving an unexplained fall 5 s and a lunatic assault. ' 9
He regarded the present case as an extension of this principle from the
realm of physical forces to that of volitional human forces. Instead of
being so placed by his duties as to receive the impact of a random bullet
or a falling cornice, the claimant is so placed as to receive the impact of
his co-worker's personality. Like the stray bullet, the topic of dispute
may arrive from outside the boundaries of the employment without affecting the result.
148 N.E.2d 100 (Ohio App. 1958); Gaudette v. Glass-Kraft, Inc., 91 R.I. 304, 163
A.2d 23 (1960).
157. 112 F.2d at 17.
158. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hoage, 62 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1932). See text
accompanying note 186 infra.
159. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hoage. 85 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1936). See
text accompanying note 115 supra.
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One such topic is politics, a notorious breeder of friction and
strain. In the Nash-Kelvinator case,' 6 0 the claimant, who had signed
a peace petition that was allegedly Communist-inspired, was thrown out
of the plant by his co-employees and seriously injured. The court
squarely rested its finding of compensability on the ground that "Iw]here
the work environment is one of the causative factors of the assault, it is
Simiimmaterial whether the motive is or is not work-connected."''
larly in the Coney case,' 62 three employees riding a car during a covered trip got into an argument on segregation at the climax of which the
driver, taking certain remarks as an iisult to himself as a "Yankee,"
slammed the brakes so violently that claimant received a whiplash injury; compensation was awarded.
Personalassaults
It is not a very great step from the friction-and-strain theory to the
positional-risk or but-for theory in assault cases-especially since Justice Rutledge himself invoked the positional-risk principle in his Hartford Accident opinion. Probably the first court to take this step was
the Supreme Court of South Dakota. In Anderson v. Hotel Cataract,63
in which a co-employee assaulted decedent after decedent had quit
work in indignation over the co-employee's taunts, the court, after quoting the HartfordAccident opinion at length, said:
But for that employment and the presence of decedent at his post
of duty in the engine room the assault would not have been made ....
Painter's opinion of deceased's capability was generated by their association in the employment, and his disparaging statements, which set forces
in motion culminating in the assault, were directed at deceased as an em64
ployee.'
The but-for rule as applied to assault has been concisely summed
up by the New Jersey court as follows: "Under the 'but-for' test, assaults by co-workers are compensable as long as they are not motivated
by personal vengeance stemming from contact with the employee outside of the employment."' 65 Using this clear rule, the court awarded
160. Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 266 Wis. 81, 62 N.D.2d 567
(1954).
161. Id. at 86, 62 N.W.2d at 570.
162. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Coney, 102 Ga. App. 155, 115 S.E.2d 633 (1960);
cf. Hartford Ace. & Indemn. Co. v. Zachary, 69 Ga. App. 250, 25 S.E.2d 135 (1943),
an earlier Georgia case denying compensation to a dishwasher who was struck with a
cleaver by a cook because the dishwasher constantly taunted him about being a gossip.
163. 70 S.D. 376, 17 N.W.2d 913 (1945).
164. Id. at 384., 17 N.W.2d at 917.
165. Crotty v. Driver Harris Co., 49 NJ. Super. 60, 73, 139 A.2d 126, 134 (1958).
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compensation when an employee had been robbed of his paycheck and
murdered by a co-employee. 166 This holding confirms the view that

any jurisdiction which, like New Jersey, has adopted the positional-risk
doctrine should generally have no difficulty applying it to disputes inand so reaching the same result as
duced by compulsory human contact
16
that in the HartfordAcident case.

7

In this category of assault cases, it is particularly important to keep
constantly in mind that the motivation of the assault, as stressed in the
New Jersey formulation, must not be "personal vengeance stemming
from contact with the employee outside the employment."' 168 When it
is clear that the origin of the assault was purely private and personal,
and that the employment contributed nothing to the episode, whether
by engendering or exacerbating the quarrel or facilitating the assault,
the assault should be held noncompensable even in states fully accepting the positional-risk test, since that test applies only when the risk is
"neutral." A failure to recognize this limitation on the positional-risk
test led to an erroneous decision, later corrected, by Mississippi,
and to some similar erroneous decisions, still uncorrected, by Louisiana.
Mississippi's original opinion in the Brookhaven case'0 9 (later with-

drawn) awarded compensation to a laundry-route driver shot by a customer with whose wife decedent had been carrying on an affair during
The but-for theory had been earlier applied to an assault on a truck driver by an outsider. Sanders v. Jarka Corp., 1 NJ. 36, 61 A.2d 641 (1948).
However, in Lester v. Elliott Bros. Trucking Co., 18 N.J. 434, 114 A.2d 8 (1955),
a quarrel between co-employees over punching a time clock, resulting in an assault,
was not held sufficiently work-connected to satisfy the Sanders case rule, by a vote
of 4-to-3.
166. Crotty v. Driver Harris Co., 49 N.J. Super. 60, 139 A.2d 126 (1958).
However, when the claimant, standing on a ladder, made disparaging remarks to an
acquaintance, and was assaulted, his contention that the positional-risk doctrine applied
because he was "trapped" on the ladder was rejected. Pittel v. Rubin Bros. Bergen
Inc., 59 N.J. Super. 531, 158 A.2d 210 (1960).
The New Jersey postitional-risk approach was strongly and authoritatively reaffirmed in Martin v. J. Lichtman & Sons, 42 N.J. 81, 199 A.2d 241 (1964). Claimant
asked a co-worker about having two jobs. Without reply and after some delay, the coworker assaulted his interrogator. The court stated that the "but for" or "positionalrisk" analogy sufficed to define the assault as work-connected. The worker had no
contacts outside their employment.
167. Cf. W.T. Edwards Hosp. v. Rakestraw, 114 So. 2d 802 (Fla. App. 1959),
in which the court preferred not to apply the positional-risk when other grounds were
available. Compensation was awarded for injuries occurring in a fight between coemployees over matters unrelated to the work, the court stressing that the fight took
place during working hours, on the work premises, and between co-employees.
168. 49 N.J. Super. 60, 73, 139 A.2d 126, 134.
169. Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 55 So. 2d 381 (Miss. 1951), rev'd 214
Miss. 569, 59 So. 2d 294 (1952).
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his regular calls for dry cleaning. The original opinion and the dissent
in the substituted opinion denying compensation 7 ' held that it was sufficient if the employment brought decedent to the place where he was
injured for personal reasons. This overlooks the justification of the
positional-risk doctrine, which is that this very slight employment contribution (bringing decedent to the place where he was killed) is
enough to swing the balance only if it is not offset by a positive showing
of personal cause of the harm. In the usual positional cases, such as
lightning, stray bullets, and lunatics running amuck, the source of the
harm has no more to do with claimant's private life than with the employment. Moreover, it is difficult to say that the "position" was a
source of risk at all, if the circumstances of the private quarrel were
such that the assault would have been made regardless of the factor of
position, since the assailant was evidently determined to have his vengeance wherever he might find his victim.
The Louisiana story begins with a case that was very close on the
facts, but in which it could still be said that the employment role was
not entirely neutral. Lovelady was on his way to seek a reconciliation
with his wife when he saw Livingston, the very man who had alienated
his wife's affections, and he took the opportunity to kill Livingston.
The court, citing the fact that Livingston was working on a Sunday and
that Lovelady had not intended to seek him out, held that the presto be killed
ence of Livingston on the highway was what caused him
171
and awarded compensation on the positional-risk theory.
Some element of employment contribution could be detected also
in the next Louisiana case in this sequence, Williams v. United States
Casualty Co.' 7 2 Bertha Mae Williams was employed at Lawson's saloon,
where she became acquainted with Warren Mills, who operated a card
game in the back room on a profit-sharing basis with Lawson. She
later became Mills' common-law wife. They moved to California, but
she returned alone. Mills also returned, but Bertha escaped his wrath
for one night. The next night Mills came into the saloon, where Bertha had returned to work as a barmaid, and shot her in the back five
times. It was stipulated that the assault was motivated by purely personal reasons. The court affirmed the compensation award on the rationale of Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co.,173 in which the
170.
(1952).
171.
172.
173.

Brookhaven Steam Laundry v. Watts, 214 Miss. 569, 640, 59 So.2d 294, 302
Livingston v. Henry & Hall, 59 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 1952).
145 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 1962).
See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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employee was killed by a tornado. The court noted that she was exposed to a greater hazard when she :ad to leave the relative protection
of the bar to serve a customer out front-where Mills shot her.
The case that appears to put Louisiana completely in a class by itself by applying the positional-risk test to a privately-motivated assault
is Rogers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 1 74 Decedent was shot while
at work as the result of a personal quarrel. The court applied the "butfor" or "positional" test and awarded compensation. The court mentioned in passing that the increased-risk test might have been applicable,
since the parties were co-employees. Unfortunately the court, in a detailed opinion, never quite faced up to the precise question involved:
Should the positional-risk theory be applied not only to neutral risks
but also to purely personal risks? The Williams and Livingston cases
had elements of special exposure to the assault, in the one case by claimant's being required to work in a barroom and in the other by his being
placed in 'the assailant's path through having to work on a road construction site. The court here would have done better to leave itself
some leeway for the future in this class of cases, by utilizing the circumstance that the assailant was a co-employee. This would have avoided
leaving matters in such a posture that absolutely any personal assault
under any circumstances becomes compensable if it occurs within the
time and space limits of the employment.
But apparently this extreme result is just what Louisiana intended,
since a later case, Gorings v. Edwards,1 75 awarded compensation in
this exact situation. Claimant was assaulted on his employer's premises while walking to work. His assailant was the husband of a woman
with whom claimant had been carrying on an affair. Compensation
was awarded, the arising-out test being met by a mere showing that
claimant was about his employer's business and not merely pursuing
his own business or pleasure at the time of the assault, and that the
necessities Qf the employer's business reasonably required that claimant
be at the place of the assault at the time that it occurred.
Unexplainedfalls
In the opening analysis of the three categories of risk, it was
shown that a particular source of injury may be classified as "neutral"
for either of two reasons: The nature of the risk may be known, but
may be associated neither with the employment nor the employee personally; or the nature of the cause of harm may be simply unknown.
174. 173 So. 2d 231 (La.App.1965).
175. 222 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 1969).
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The most common example of the latter is the unexplained fall in the
course of employment. If an employee falls while walking down the

sidewalk or across a level factory floor for no discoverable reason, the
injury resembles that from stray bullets and other positional risks in this

respect: The particular injury would not have happened if the employee had not been engaged upon an employment errand at the time.
In a pure unexplained-fall case, there is no way in which an award can

be justified as a matter of causation theory except by a recognition that
this but-for reasoning satisfies the "arising" requirement. In appraising the extent to which courts are willing to accept this general but-for

theory, then, it is significant to note that most courts confronted with
176
the unexplained-fall problem have seen fit to award compensation.

176. Federal: New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hoage, 62 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
See text accompanying note 186 infra.
Connecticut: Ryerson v. A.E. Bounty Co., 107 Conn. 370, 140 A. 728 (1928).
See text accompanying note 185 infra. Accord, Stankewicz v. Stanley Works, 139 Conn.
215, 92 A.2d 736 (1952).
Florida: Damon v. Central Hotel, 135 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1961). See text accompanying note 207 infra.
Georgia: American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. King, 88 Ga. App. 176, 76 S.E.2d 81
(1953), holding it immaterial whether a stroke occurred before or after a fall if the
fall aggravated the condition.
Indiana: Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Dehn, 110 Ind. App. 483, 39 N.E.2d 499
(1942). See text accompanying note 187 infra; Burton-Shields Co. v. Steele, 119 Ind.
App. 216, 83 N.E.2d 623 (1949). See text accompanying note 189 infra.
Kentucky: Coomes v. Robertson Lumber Co., 4:a7 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. App. 1968).
Claimant was seen unloading lumber from a truck, and shortly thereafter was found
by the truck dazed and bleeding from a head wound. There were no witnesses to the
incident, and because of the consequences of the injury, claimant was not able to explain what had happened. The court reversed a denial of compensation benefits.
New Jersey: Spindler v. Universal Chain Corp., 11 NJ. 34, 93 A.2d 171 (1952),
awarding compensation to a 75-year-old woman who inexplicably fell as she turned
to replace a wrench on a shelf.
New York: Martin v. Plaut, 293 N.Y. 617, 59 N.E.2d 429 (1944) (see text accompanying note 185 infra); Unger v. New York Sportswear Co., 268 N.Y. 651, 198
N.E. 540 (1935) (see text accompanying note 184 infra); Andrews v. L. & S. Amusement Corp., 253 N.Y. 97, 170 N.E. 506 (1930) (see text accompanying note 180 infra);
Heck v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 12 App. Div. 2d 672, 207 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1960); Moraes v.
Davis, 2 App. Div. 2d 619, 152 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1956); Hoye v. City of New York, 268
App. Div. 944, 51 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1944); Schiff v. Bow-Made Coat Co., 264 App. Div.
966, 37 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1942); Motto v. Chesapeake House, 252 App. Div. 906, 299
N.Y.S. 658 (1937); Bauer v. City of New York, 252 App. Div. 802, 298 N.Y.S. 853
(1937); Kefford v. Federal Reserve Bank, 246 App. Div. 660, 283 N.Y.S. 263 (1935).
See Cornaglia v. Felice Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 688, 295 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1968).
Claimant in the restaurant where he was employed, went downstairs, and ten minutes
later returned upstairs covered with blood and unable to recall what had happened. Fellow employees found a pool of blood on the landing at the bottom of the stairs. Claimant later drove home, where his wife found him in the garage covered with blood and
bleeding from the ears. He was found to have a skull fracture and concussion. Evi-
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A substantial minority, however, deny compensation in unexplained
fall situations. 177
dence held sufficient to support a finding that claimant was injured when he fell down the
stairs at work.
North Carolina: Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills, 220 N.C. 246, 17 S.E.2d 20
(1941).
Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 132 S.E.2d 865 (1963). The employee bled to death from a scalp wound received in an unwitnessed fall. Compensation was awarded.
Calhoun v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 6 N.C. App. 386, 170 S.E.2d 177 (1969). Decedent
was found lying at the bottom of some stairs where he had been working, with a skull
fracture from which he eventually died. There was no explanation as to how or
why he was injured. A finding that decedent had fallen down the stairs was held
not supported by the evidence, but the evidence was held sufficient to support an award
on the grounds that decedent had in some way fallen, causing the skull fracture and
death.
England: Upton v. Great Central Ry., [1924] A.C. 302. See text accompanying
note 178 infra.
177. Colorado: Finn v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542 (1968).
Claimant was found lying unconscious at the place of his employment shortly after beginning work. He had a small skull fracture, head abrasions, black eyes, and bruises on
his forearms. There was no explanation as to how the injuries occurred. The court
stated that the circumstances surrounding the injuries did not raise a presumption of
compensability, and that the claimant had failed to show that the injuries were connected
with the employment. Denial of compensation affirmed.
Missouri: Wheaton v. Reiser Co., 419 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). Decedent
was removing varnish from some pillars using a liquid varnish remover. He was seen
to fall against the pillar, and then to the floor, striking his head. However, the witness
who observed the fall stated that he did not trip, stumble, or slip, but merely fell over.
Death was probably due to a subdural hemorrhage, which a doctor testified was a result of decedent's striking his head on the floor. There was no direct evidence as to the
cause of the fall, although decedent did have a history of heart trouble. The court held
that, although the commission was wrong in treating the fall as idiopathic, instead of
as the result of unknown causes, it was correct in denying death benefits, since claimant
had failed to show a causal connection between the work and the fall, and there was no
presumption applicable to the circumstances of the incident.
Ohio: Postel v. Industrial Comm'n, 163 Ohio St. 617, 128 N.E.2d 29 (1955); Eggers v. Industrial Comm'n, 157 Ohio St. 70, 104 N.E.2d 681 (1952).
Oregon: Puckett v. Wagner, 487 P.2d 897 (Ore. App. 1971). Claimant was
sent home from work because he had been drinking. He was found on the employers
premises lying on a sidewalk. The next day he was found to have sustained a fractured
vertebra. The claimant could not recall how or why he fell, and in fact the fall might
have been due to an old injury. The court held that as a matter of law the claimant
had not sustained his burden of proving a compensable accident, and an award of
benefits was improper.
Rhode Island: Grassel v. Garde Mfg. Co., 90 R.I. 1, 153 A.2d 527 (1959) (Roberts & Paolino, JJ., dissenting).
South Carolina: Bagwell v. Ernest Burwell, Inc., 227 S.C. 444, 88 S.E.2d 611
(1955).
Wisconsin: Nielsen v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Wis. 2d 112, 109 N.W.2d 483 (1961).
See text accompanying note 209 infra.
Brickson v. Department of Indus., 40 Wis. 2d 694, 162 N.W.2d 600 (1968).
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The leading unexplained fall case, both because it was the earliest,
and because it is a carefully considered pronouncement by England's
highest court on the meaning of the act from which almost all American acts were copied, is Upton v. Great Central Railway,"8 in which
compensation was awarded to an employee who fell on a railway platform in the course of a business errand. The opinion emphasizes that
the platform was not slippery or defective in any way; the cause of the
fall was completely unknown. The decision of the House of Lords was
unanimous. Lord Atkinson's language is of interest:
Here the accident was caused by the performance of an act the deceased was employed to perform-namely, to traverse the platform.
* , , Having been done in the course of the employment of the deceased, and the accident having been caused by the doing of it even incautiously, it must, I think, be held that the accident arose out of the em179
ployment of the deceased.
The Upton case was expressly approved by the New York Court
of Appeals, in these words: "An award was sustained. It would be
sustained by us. We have such cases frequently."' 0 It is true that
New York has repeatedly sustained unexplained-fall awards. 1 1 For
example, in Martin v. Plaut,8 2 an award was affirmed virtually without
discussion of the "arising" question on the following simple account of
the accident:
Claimant, employed as a cook, was injured when she fell as she
turned suddenly to pick up some of her clothes while dressing one morning in a bedroom furnished in her employer's home for her use. What
caused her to fall she could not say unless it was the quickness of her
movement. She had just left her bed and was dressing to go out and do
83
her work. She was not conscious of having tripped over anything.'
Again, in Unger v.New York Spdrtwear Co., 8 4 claimant testified
that she did not slip or stumble, but merely "lost her balance" and fell
while working along Seventh Avenue in the course of her employment.
An award was affirmed.
Claimant ate lunch in the company lunch room and then went to the washroom. While
leaving, she slipped and fell, and was injured. There was apparently no explanation for
the fall, and, because of the absence of any credible evidence showing the cause of
the fall and a relationship to the employment, a denial of benefits was held proper.
178. [1924] A.C. 302.
179. Id. at 315.
180. Andrews v. L. & S. Amusement Corp., 253 N.Y. 97, 101, 170 N.E.2d 506, 508
(1930).
181. See note 176 supra.
182. 293 N.Y. 617, 59 N.E.2d 429 (1944).
183. Id. at 618, 59 N.E.2d at 429.
184. 268 N.Y.651, 198 N.E. 540 (1935).
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Very similar to Martin v. Plaut is a Connecticut case 8 5 in which
compensation was awarded to a seventy-two-year-old man who, while
preparing horse feed in his room, slipped and broke his hip when he
was about to sit down in a rocking chair and tie his shoelace. And
several jurisdictions have made awards on facts closely resembling
those in the Unger case. In awarding compensation to a solicitor for
an unexplained fall while he was crossing tie street, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said simply that the requirements of
the employment placed him in the position where the accident occurred.186 The clearest but-for or positional language occurs in the
Indiana .case of Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Dehn.18 7 Here too,
the facts showed merely that a city salesman, for no apparent reason,
fell on a sidewalk. After speculating about all the things that might
have caused the fall, including overexertion, vertigo, assault, and so on,
the court decided the case squarely as an unexplained-fall problem,
saying:
[T]he causal connection is sufficiently established by the fact that the
Industrial Board could reasonably have determined that the accident
would not have occurred and the injury would not have been received if
the employee had not been required, in performing the duties of his employment, to be traveling the particular street at the particular time, under the particular conditions and environment.' 5 5
This position is affirmed in a later case 89 in which the court said:
"The cause of the fall may be disregarded if the fall resulted in the injuries which would not have occurred except for the employment."'1 0
In another case involving a completely inexplicable fall,'' the
North Carolina Supreme Court in effect said that when an accident occurred in the course of employment, and there is no affirmative evidence
that it arose from a cause independent of the employment, an award
would be sustained. In the terminology adopted by this article, this
would mean that all injuries from neutral risks are compensable.
There are several cases in which the contrary result has been
reached, but to a considerable degree this appears to be the result of
185. Ryerson v. A.E. Bounty Co., 107 Conn.370, 140 A. 728 (1928).
186. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hoage, 62 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
187. 110 Ind. App. 483, 39 N.E.2d 499 (1942).
"188. Id. at 503, 39 N.E.2d at 507.
189. Burton-Shields Co. v. Steele, 119 Ind. App. 216, 83 N.E.2d 623 (1949).
But cl. the later history of the positional-risk doctrine in Indiana discussed in
the text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
190. 119 Ind. App. at 222, 83 N.E.2d at 625.
191. Robins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills, 220 N.C. 246, 17 S.E.2d 20 (1941).

THE POSITIONAL-RISK DOCTRINE

some confusion between true unexplained-fall cases and cases in which
there was at least some possibility of a personal or idiopathic factor
contributing to the fall. Thus, in Rozek's Case'92 the court said:
So far, however, as there was any evidence of the cause of the fall
it tended to show that the fall and the resulting fracture of the skull were
caused by heart disease. Unless this was the cause of the fall it remains
wholly unexplained by evidence or reasonable inference ....
The court then went on to state in general terms that:
A fall by an employee while at work, where neither the cause of
the fall nor of the resulting injury bears any special relation to his work
or to the conditions under which it was performed, though it arises "in
the course of" the employment, does not arise "out of" the employment
193
within the meaning of the statute.
This generalization seems to be at least partially in the nature of
dictum, because of the presence of a personal risk-heart disease-as
an explanation of the fall, supported by at least some evidence. Whenever personal disease or weakness contributes to the fall, an entirely
new set of rules comes into play, since the risk is no longer neutral but
either personal, or perhaps "mixed," and the majority rule requires that
the employment, to offset this primarily personal causation, contribute
something to the risk, such as a height from which the employee falls,
or a dangerous object that he encounters. 194 There are also many cases
in which the fall itself is unexplained, but the employment similarly
makes a contribution to the ultimate injury by having placed claimant
on a height, or by putting in his way some object which he strikes in
falling. Since such a contribution makes a fall compensable even when
the original cause of the fall is epilepsy, vertigo, or some other clearly
personal weakness, a fortiori the effects of the fall are compensable
when the cause is unknown. Thus, when a workman fell backward for
some reason, while lowering a flag, compensation was awarded because
his head struck a cement platform on which he was standing.' 95 In a
Massachusetts case,' 9 ' work connection was found in some evidence of
slipping, and in contact with a truck that the employee struck in falling.
Rozek's Case, quoted above, was distinguished on these facts. And in
192. 294 Mass. 205, 200 N.E. 903 (1936).

As to falls resulting in death, this case has been overruled by a 1971 amendment

creating a presumption of coverage. See Mass. Workmen's Compensation Law § 7A,
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 152, § 7A (Supp. 1972).
193. 294 Mass. at 207-08, 200 N.E. at 904-05.
194. See 1 A. LAnsoN, Thn LAw oF WonxmN's COmPENSATzON, § 12.10-.14
(1972).
195. De Vine v. Dave Steel Co., 227 N.C. 684, 44 S.E.2d 77 (1947).
196. Caccamo's Case, 316 Mass. 358, 55 N.E.2d 614 (1944).
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New York, sufficient causal relationship in unexplained-fall situations
has been found when the fall was from a height because claimant's
employment placed him on a wagon, 19 7 and when the claimant in falling struck a propeller lying on a pier. 9"
The danger of confusion when the element of possible idiopathic
causation is speculated on but is not supported by the evidence is illustrated by an intermediate New Jersey decision, Stulb v. Foodcraft,
Inc.'99 In this case the claimant, while standing at a desk, suddenly
fell backward and fractured his skull on the concrete floor. There was
no evidence on why he fell. The defense contended that the cause of
the fall must have been idiopathic. The court stated that the burden of
proving this fact was on the respondent, citing the Spindler0 0 case.
But, unlike the Spindler case, decided by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, which held an unexplained fall compensable when idiopathic
origin was not proved, the intermediate court abruptly concluded that,
when no idiopathic cause is shown, and when the "cause is simply
unknown," the case is not compensable. In the Spindler case, the
court, by a process of elimination, concluded that the fall "was brought
about by the employee's turning to replace the instrument she was
using, to the shelf located behind her, in furtherance of the purpose of
her employment. If the turn had not been endeavored the loss of
balance preceding it and the fall would not have occurred." '0 It is difficult to see how this can mean anything other than that unexplained
falls have been held to be compensable in New Jersey by its highest
court. It makes no sense to say that the cause was not unexplained because the cause was the turning to replace the tool. Reference to this
fact does not "explain"; it merely tells us what the claimant was doing
when the unexplained fall took place. The real question is what caused
the plaintiff to fall as she was turning around. This remains completely unexplained.
It is difficult to believe that the Stulb decision will survive in New
Jersey, which has extended the positional-risk doctrine not only to stray
arrows 20 2 but-even to kitchen cabinets,2 0 3 and which has, in the Spindler case, adopted the only rule that is consistent with the positional-risk
197. Mausert v. Albany Builders' Supply Co., 250 N.Y. 21, 164 N.E. 729 (1928).
198. Aanonsen v. Jakobson & Peterson, 260 App. Div. 967, 23 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1940).
199. 76 N.J. Super. 384, 184 A.2d 673 (1962).
200. Spindler v. Universal Chain Corp., 11 N.J. 34, 93 A.2d 171 (1952).
201. Id. at 39, 93 A.2d at 173.
202. Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 13 N.J. 8, 97 A.2d 593 (1953). See text accompanying
note 1 supra.
203. Brooks v. Dee Realty Co., 72 N.J. Super. 499, 178 A.2d 644 (1962).
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doctrine: the rule that an unexplained fall, being attributable neither
to the employment nor to the claimant personally, is a neutral risk. It
is no answer to this to say that the burden is on the claimant to prove
his case. He has proved his case when he proves an injury by accident
in the course of employment from a neutral risk-as much so when
the neutral risk is an unexplained event as when it is an arrow out of
nowhere.
An intermediate Florida court has also had difficulty in this area
because of failure to distinguish idiopathic from neutral causes of falls.
In Vander Linden v. Reed Construction Corp.,20 4 a workman, while
working in a bent position with his head down for an indefinite period
of time placing mortar underneath a form for piling, straightened himself up when summoned by a co-employee. As he stood up he fell to
the ground and sustained injuries. There was no medical evidence indicating that the fall was due to a preexisting malady. Nevertheless, the
court denied compensation, citing two idiopathic-fall cases, one involving a heart attack, 20 1 and one involving a dizzy spell. 20
The court
then merely announced that there was no connection with the employment in the instant case. However, the Supreme Court of Florida, in a
more recent decision, 20 7 for all practical purposes adopted the doctrine
that unexplained falls are compensable. In this case the manager of a
hotel fell in the hallway of the hotel, but could not explain why. She
stated: "Whether I caught my robe or whether the carpet was loose or
whether I tripped on that or not, I don't know."20 The court said that
the cause of the fall was not altogether unexplained, since the claimant
had listed several possibilities, and that any of them would have rendered the accident compensable and would exclude any inference that
the fall was idopathic. Perhaps one could justify this interpretation of
the claimant's testimony oi a highly legalistic and literal basis, but the
obvious reading of the claimant's statement is that she simply did not
know what happened at all, and was merely tossing out random examples of speculative possibilities which came to her mind.
Another decision that appears to have missed the essence of the
unexplained-fall problem is Nielsen v. Industrial Commission.20 9 In
this case a chambermaid fell while returning to the hotel from the hotel
laundry where she had eaten lunch. She could not explain how or
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

115 So. 2d 706 (Fla. App. 1959).
Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 16 So. 2d 342 (1944).
Foxworth v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 86 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1955).
Damon v. Central Hotel, 135 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1961).
Id. at 205.
14 Wis. 2d 112, 109 N.W.2d 483 (1961).
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why she fell. Compensation was denied. The decision is all the more
unfortunate because the court had earlier adopted the positional-risk
test by stating that an injury is compensable when "[the] circumstances of the employment [place] the employee in the particular place
at the particular time when he is injured by a force which is not solely
personal to him."21 0 If the court had merely applied this test, it could
have gone on to point out that an unexplained cause is a neutral cause
and, when the cause is neutral, it cannot be said that the cause is
"solely personal."1211 Instead, the court stated that the issue was
whether there was a presumption that unexplained falls arose out of the
employment. To cast the issue in terms of a presumption is merely to
introduce an unnecessary fiction into the question of work connection.
Work connection is shown by the fact that the injury occurred in the
course of employment, and that the employment brought the employee
to the place where he was injured at the time when he was injured; as
against this, there is no evidence whatever of any personal contribution
to the injury. This being so, there is no need to look for implied presumptions as a precondition to compensability.
In addition to these cases, there are several that deny compensation on the straightforward ground that the employee cannot recover
unless he affirmatively proves his entire case, including the employment-connected nature of the cause of his fall.2" 2 Since the compensability of unexplained falls is related to the compensability of neutral
and positional risks, it is not surprising that some states that are not yet
ready to accept the positional-risk doctrine are also unwilling to award
compensation for unexplained falls. But, as in those jurisdictions
whose decisions have been analyzed here at length, where the neutralrisk concept has been accepted for other purposes, a lot of confusion,
circumlocutions, and fictions could be avoided in the unexplained-fall
cases by merely accepting the proposition that what is unexplained is
neutral.
Unexplaineddeaths
When an employee is found dead under circumstances indicating
210. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 5 Wis. 2d 247, 253, 92 N.W.2d 824,
827 (1958).
211. The same observation can be made as to Colorado, which pioneered in applying
the positional-risk test in a lightning case, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81
Colo. 233, 254 P. 995 (1927), and a lunatic-assault case, London Guar. & Accident Co.
v. McCoy, 97 Colo. 13, 45 P.2d 900 (1935), but which has not made the carry-over of
the neutral-risk principle to the unexplained-fall area. See Finn v. Industrial Comm'n,
165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542 (1968).
212. See note 177 supra.
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that death took place within the time and space limits of the employment, in the absence of any evidence of what caused the death, most
courts will indulge a presumption or inference that the death arose out
of the employment. 2 13 Awards for unexplained deaths can be theoretically assimilated to awards for unexplained falls and assaults by bring-

ing them within the basic positional-risk justification: The occurrence
of the death within the course of employment at least indicates that the
employment brought deceased within the range of the harm, and the

cause of harm, being unknown, is neutral and not personal. However,
the fact that a jurisdiction makes an award in an unexplained-death

case, as almost all do, is seldom in itself a reliable indication that the
jurisdiction has adopted the positional-risk doctrine, and therefore this

prolific category will not be discussed in detail here.

The reason for

this unreliability is that there are usually grounds other than positional-

risk theory on which an unexplained-death award can be rested. The
commonest is the practical argument that, when the death itself has
removed the only possible witness who could prove causal connection,
fairness to the dependents suggests some softening of the rule requiring

claimant to provide affirmative proof of each requisite element of compensability. In a number of jurisdictions this principle is expressed in
a statutory
presumption of compensability in unexplained-death
14
cases.

2

Moreover, the "purity" of these cases for purposes of positionalrisk theory is usually muddied either by factors suggesting some employment contribution, as when a distinctive employment hazard like a
cave-in2 1 5 or dynamite explosion 210 figures in an unwitnessed death,
or, conversely, by personal causal elements, as when an idiopathic

weakness or disease, such as a pre-existing heart condition,2 17 plays a
213. See, e.g., the following cases that are relatively "pure" unexplained-death cases,
in that there is nothing in the evidence suggesting even a slight inference of either an
employment or a personal origin of the harm, as when the only known facts are that
a night watchman is found dead at his post of duty:
Federal: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 140 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
California: Western Grain & Sugar Prod. Co. v. Pillsbury, 173 Cal. 135, 159 P.
423 (1916).
Illinois: Mechanics' Furniture Co. v. Industrial Bd., 281 Ill. 530, 117 N.E. 986
(1917).
New lersey: Cole v. L Lewis Cigar Mfg. Co., 63 A.2d 293 (N.J. County Ct. 1948).
214. See Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Law, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
152, § 7A (1965).
215. Macko v. Herbert Hinchman & Son, 24 N.J. Super. 304, 94 A.2d 690 (1953),
expressly disapproving the contra case of Nardone v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 113
NJ.L. 540, 174 A. 745 (1934).
216. Medina v. New Mexico Consol. Mining Co., 51 N.M. 493, 188 P.2d 343 (1947).
217. Fishman v. Lousan Gen. Constr. Corp., 11 A.D.2d 887, 202 N.Y.S.2d 795
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part. Accordingly, although the normal rule in unexplained-death
cases fits logically within positional-risk doctrine, it is a rarity to find
this doctrine advanced as the principal justification of the result. 218

Rescue of strangers
There remains to be noted one final category in which the posi-

tional-risk principle has figured-that of rescue of strangers. The cases
in this category differ from almost all of those so far discussed in that

the neutral "risk," instead of being some outside force that acts directly
on claimant, is not a force but an opportunity or implied invitation to
rescue, encountered by claimant because of his employment.

It is not

injurious by its own unaided operation, but becomes injurious only
through the volitional act of the claimant in responding to the opportunity. Moreover, while in the usual positional-risk case the course of
employment factor is beyond dispute, in the rescue cases the employee
typically leaves the duties and premises of his employment in order to
attempt the rescue.

The positional-risk element appears only when the person rescued
is someone to whom the employer has no relationship or potential liability. It has long been settled that efforts to rescue co-employees, ' 19
or other persons to whom the employer might have some duty, 220 arise
out of and in the course of employment. The really controversial issue
in the rescue field is the question whether injury incurred in the rescue
of a stranger should be held compensable.

A long step toward coverage of such injuries was taken in the lead(1960), af'd, 10 N.Y.2d 919, 179 N.E.2d 712, 223 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1961), in which, even
under the New York statutory presumption of coverage, compensation was denied
when a carpenter died of an artery disease and myocardial infarction, having fallen from
a board platform while painting a ceiling, because of the absence of any evidence of
accidental injury or unusual exertion to hasten the death.
218. For further discussion of the various issues surrounding unexplained deaths, see
1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATON, §§ 10.32-33(c) (1972).
219. Yates v. South Kirby, Featherstone & Hemsworth Collieries [1910] 2 K.B.
538; Dragovich v. Iroquois Iron Co., 269 Ill. 478, 109 N.E. 999 (1915).
220. Thus, when a hotel cook, on discovering a fire, rushed upstairs to warn the
guests, she was plainly discharging a duty owed by the innkeeper to his guests. Stilson
v. Littlewood, 244 App. Div. 858, 279 N.Y.S. 781 (1935).
A similar principle, on much less impressive facts, was at work in a British case,
in which a baker, employed on a ship, heard a passenger using bad language in the
presence of some lady passengers, and when he ordered the villain to desist, got cut up
for his pains. Compensation was awarded under the emergency doctrine, since claimant was discharging his employer's duty of protecting his passengers from the sound
of profanity. Culpeck v. Orient Steam Nay. Co., 15 Butterworth's W.C.C. 187 (C.A.
1922).
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ing case of Waters v. William J. Taylor Co.2 21 The deceased was employed by one contractor on a construction project, and about twenty
feet from him the employee of another contractor was trapped by a
cave-in while at work on the excavation for the same building. In attempting to rescue him deceased was killed by a second cave-in, and a
compensation award against the deceased's own employer was upheld
by the highest New York court, the Court of Appeals.
The next leading case was Puttkammer v. Industrial Commision,2 2 in which a truck driver stopped at the scene of a collision in
which he was not involved, and was killed while carrying an injured
child away from the accident. In awarding compensation, the Illinois
Supreme Court approached the question as one of possible deviation, and
concluded that the "deviation" to pick up the child was as much a natural
incident of the job of truck driver as going across the street for a drink
would be. It would be paradoxical indeed, as the court observed, if
23
crossing the road to get a glass of beer could be held compensable,
while crossing the road to pick up an injured child could not. Note that
this reasoning echoed that in the Waters opinion: The rescue was a
natural incident to be expected in the course of employment of this kind.
The rule at this point did not go so far as to say that every rescue
of a stranger by an employee is covered; it referred to making a rescue
the necessity for which is thrown in claimant's path by the distinctive
conditions of his employment. When claimant is a worker in an area
where construction and excavation are in progress, or a truck driver
who is certain to encounter collisions along the highway, it is easy to
see the connection between the work and the contact with the emergency. It will be observed that there is something of a parallel here to
221. 218 N.Y. 248, 112 N.E. 727 (1916).
In the later case of Priglise v. Fonda, Johnstown & Gloversville Railroad, 192 App.
Div. 776, 183 N.Y.S. 414 (1920), the Appellate Division, an intermediate court, ignoring
the broad principles announced by the Court of Appeals, held the rule of the case to be
limited to the rescue of employees working on the same project-a factual limitation
which, in terms of principle, makes no sense at all. The deceased was a flagman at
a crossing of an electric railway, which paralleled a crossing of the New York Central
having a gateman of its own. Some school children ran in front of an approaching
New York Central train, in spite of the New York Central gateman's shouts, and deceased was killed trying to save one of the children. Compensation was denied, because, said the court, it was the other gateman's job to protect that crossing, and therefore it could not have been contemplated by deceased's employer that deceased should
ever have to save children on the adjoining tracks. The court gave the deceased "the
highest commendation" and "admiration for his heroism," but no money. Id. at 779,
183 N.Y.S. at 416.
222. 371 Ill. 497, 21 N.E.2d 575 (1939).
223. See Martin v. John Lovibond & Sons [1914) 2 K.B. 227.
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a similar stage in the stray-bullet story, when the necessity arose of expanding the street-risk concept to accommodate the situation of workers
whose occupations were thought to involve special exposure to such

risks.
It remained for the Supreme Court of the United States to extend
the rescue doctrine to its ultimate limit, by covering the rescue of complete strangers when the connection with the employment is furnished,
not by the nature of the employment, but solely by the fact that the
employment brought the employee to the place where he observed the
occasion for the rescue attempt. In O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon,
Inc.,22 4 decedent was an employee of a governmental contractor operating on the island of Guam. The contractor maintained for its employees a recreation center near the shoreline, along which ran a channel so
dangerous for swimmers that its use was forbidden, and signs to that effect were erected. Decedent had spent the afternoon at the center,
and was waiting for his employer's bus to take him from the area when
he saw or heard two men, standing on the reefs beyond the channel,
signaling for help. Followed by nearly twenty others, he plunged in to
effect a rescue. In attempting to swim the channel to reach the two
men, he drowned. The Supreme Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit,22 ;
ordered the award of compensation reinstated, three Justices dissent22 6
ing.
The Court's discussion of the reasons for this pioneering holding is
in very brief and general terms: "The test of recovery is not a causal
relation between the nature of employment of the injured person and
the accident. ' 227 Note that this sentence rules out at once any distinction between cases involving flagmen, truckers, and the like, and those
involving ordinary employees who are not by the nature of their occupations brought in contact with emergency situations.
All that is required is that the "obligations or conditions" of employment create the "zone of special danger" out of which the injury
arose. . . . A reasonable rescue attempt, like pursuit in aid of an officer making an arrest, may be "one of the risks of the employment, an
incident of the service, foreseeable, if not foreseen, and so covered by
the statute. '228
224. 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
225. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc. v. O'Leary, 182 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1950), rev'd, 340

U.S. 504 (1951).
226. The dissent was written by Mr. Justice Minton, joined by Mr. Justice Jackson and
Mr. Justice Burton. 340 U.S. at 509.
227. Id. at 506-07.
228. Id. at 507.
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The Babington229 and Puttkammer230 cases, cited for this proposition, do not, however, support the novel contribution made by this case,
since in both cases the character of the emergency was peculiarly associated with the character of the employment. The Babington case
involved a cab driver who was pressed into the pursuit of a fugitive by
a police officer; the Puttkammer case, as we have seen, involved
a trucker who encountered a highway accident along the road.
It cannot be too strongly stressed that the Brown-Pacific-Maxon
decision goes a crucial step beyond the Waters, Babington, and Puttkammer cases on which it relies. The Waters case contained general
expressions broad enough to cover the Brown-Pacific-Maxon facts; but
the actual Waters facts showed that the exigencies of the employment
brought the rescuer and victim together in a dangerous place, namely,
an excavation, where the character of the work might well be deemed
to include the obligation to engage in rescue when slides or other mishaps occurred. The Brown-Paciiic-Maxon case adopts the positionalrisk theory in its purest form, by finding work-connection if the employment merely brings the employee to the place where he encounters
a moral obligation to rescue a stranger. Presumably it would follow
that an office worker who observed a street accident from a third-floor
window would remain in the course of employment when rushing to
aid the victims, since the employment would have provided the contact
between the employee and the rescue opportunity.
The same week the Brown-Pacific-Maxon case was being argued,
the Louisiana Court of Appeals denied an award in a case of this type,
relying upon the Brown-Pacific-Maxon decision in the Ninth Circuit,
which was on the verge of being reversed. In Edwards v. Louisiana
Forestry Commission,2 1 1 a towerman in a forest observation tower saw
a child being attacked by a dog near the foot of the tower. He hurried
down the stairway and killed the dog, which proved to be rabid; but
the exertion caused an inguinal hernia. The court summed up available
precedents by saying: ". . . awards have been sustained in instances
where some association between the act and the employment could be
justified or where the service of the interest of the employer might be
'232
recognized.
This employment probably could not be characterized as one
which by its nature brings the employee in contact with rescue oppor229.
230.
231.
232.

Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726 (1928).
Puttkammer v. Industrial Comm'n, 371 Ill.
497, 21 N.E.2d 575 (1939).
49 So. 2d 53 (La. App. 1950), rev'd, 221 La. 818, 60 So. 2d 449 (1952).
49 So. 2d at 55.
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tunities. In spite of the fact that his tower gives him a wide range of
vision, the towerman is hardly in a position, in his remote perch in the
forest, where the rescuing of privately-imperiled strangers might be
deemed an incident of his kind of work. To cover this case, it was
necessary to go the entire distance along the path blazed by the Supreme Court. Judge Kennon, dissenting, was prepared to adopt such a
rule, in the following words:
It is my opinion that a workman, confronted by an emergency of
the sort described, in which he is the only adult present to avert an impending danger to a fellow human being, particularly a child of tender
years, has the right to take such action and to render such assistance as
an ordinarily prudent person would do under the same circumstances,
does not constitute a "turning aside" from his emand that such action
233
ployer's business.
After the United States Supreme Court decision was handed down,
the Edwards case was reversed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 234
relying both on the Brown-Pacific-Maxon case and on the Puttkammer
case. It is a reasonable conclusion, then, that the rule in Louisiana
may be taken to be that expressed in the quotation from Judge Kennon's dissent. The Supreme Court of Louisiana thus takes its place
alongside the Supreme Court of the United States in applying the full
positional-risk doctrine to rescue cases. This is an appropriate and
consistent posture, since Louisiana pioneered in the development of
the positional-risk doctrine in the more elementary category of tornadoes.235
New Jersey, which has also been in the forefront of the positionalrisk states, by virtue of such decisions as Gargiulo v. Gargiulo,2 3" the
stray-arrow case, has also appropriately accepted the full implications
of that doctrine in rescue situations. The decedent in Reilly v. Weber
Engineering Co. 2 1 7 had worked as a fire captain in the city fire department, and had also worked for Weber three days a week. While engaged in his regular duties with Weber, decedent became aware of an
emergency on some train tracks near Weber's premises. He went to
233. Id.
234. Edwards v. Louisiana Forestry Comm'n, 221 La. 818, 60 So. 2d 449 (1952). Although the decision was set aside on rehearing on the ground that a decision on the merits was premature, the opinion clearly indicates the intention of the Louisiana Supreme
Coirt to follow the broad rescue rule accepted by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Id. at 834, 60 So. 2d 457.
235. Harvey v. Caddo De Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 6 So. 2d 747 (1942).
236. 12 N.J. 607, 97 A.2d 593 (1953).
237. 107 N.J. Super. 254, 258 A.2d 36 (1969).
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assist in helping a young boy who had been caught in some electrical
wires, and while doing so was killed. His death was held to be compensable, on the grounds that the rescue attempt was within the scope
of decedent's employment, and that but for the fact of the employment
with Weber the death would not have occurred. Although the facts
included one item that might have supplied a small morsel of special
work-connection-the fact that the secretary of the company's president
had asked to have the cause of the commotion investigated-the court
put the result on strictly positional-risk grounds.2 38 Just as the employment brought Gargiulo "into the line of fire of the arrow, where he
would not have been but for his employment," so the employment
brought Reilly into the range of a call for rescue where he would not
have been but for his employment.
Minnesota had an opportunity to join this advance guard, but declined it, in the case of Weidenbach v. Miller.2 39 The deceased, a
truck driver, accompanied by his employer, was driving along a lake,
the shore of which followed the highway. They observed a man
floundering in the lake. The employer said in effect, "There is a man
in the lake. We had better stop." The deceased stopped the truck,
leaped over a fence and went on to the frozen lake. While he was attempting the rescue, the ice gave way and he drowned. The employer had followed and called to deceased to return because the ice was
thin. He had also tried to reach deceased with a limb after he had
fallen through. The court, after noting numerous cases, observed that
awards have been made when the act was incidental to the employment,
in the sense that assistance to injured people on the highway is an incident of truck driving. But since the stranger to be rescued here was
not on the highway the court stated the issue to be:
Can it be said that assistance to any person observed to be in peril
off the highway, regardless of the distance separating such person from
the highway is incidental to the employment so long as such person is
240
within the range of the employee's vision?
The court answered in the negative, and affirmed the Commission's
denial of compensation. As to the contention that the employer enlarged the employment scope by ordering the 'rescue, the court stated
that there was no express direction to go to the aid of a stranger: "At
238. The court quotes with approval the writer's characterization of Brown-PacificMaxon as an adoption of "the positional risk theory in its purest form." Id. at 261,
258 A.2d at 40, quoting 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 28.23 at
452.85 (1906).
239. 237 Minn. 278, 55 N.W.2d 289 (1952).
240. Id. at 291, 55 N.W.2d at 296.
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best the employer inquired of the employee whether they should not
241
do so."1
The court attempted to distinguish the O'Leary case on the basis,
first, that the Commission had there awarded compensation; and second, that the "zone of danger", that is, the channel in which the employee had lost his life, was adjacent to the recreation center. Thus,
said the court, it was reasonably foreseeable that someone might venture into the danger zone and that those using the recreation center
might go to the rescue.
These two grounds of distinction are somewhat less than convincing. As to the first, the question whether the Commission had initially
awarded or denied compensation would be important if the issue had
been one of fact; but here the issue was not only one of law-it was the
kind of ground-breaking legal question for which courts of last resort
have a peculiarly pressing responsibiliy to play their part in the development of compensation law. As to the second ground of distinction, that the conditions of O'Leary's employment brought him near
the body of water which proved to be a zone of danger, and that it was
reasonably foreseeable that someone might venture into the danger
zone, the same could be said with equal force of the facts in the Weidenbach case. The state of Minnesota has been at great pains to drill
into the consciousness of every American the fact that Minnesota is the
land of the 10,000 lakes. Indeed, some say that the actual number is
higher, but then much depends on one's definition of a lake. In any
event the court could readily and properly have taken judicial notice of
this fact, with the corollary fact that anyone driving a truck in Minnesota is certain to be driving alongside lakes frequently. As for the foreseeability of seeing people venturing out onto these lakes, there is no
reason to suppose that the disposition of human beings to go out onto
bodies of water and get into trouble is any more highly-developed in
Guam than in Minnesota. Most lakes in Minnesota are just as much
recreational areas as the area involved in the O'Leary case-more so, in
fact, since the particular area in the O'Leary case had been banned for
recreational use, while the Minnesota lakes are freely open for swimming, boating, skating, and both summer and winter fishing.
The distinctions between the two cases, such as they are, make the
Minnesota case a stronger one for compensation. The truck driver
was actively working at the time of the rescue opportunity; O'Leary
was engaged in recreation. The truck driver became originally involved
241. Id. at 292-93, 55 N.W.2d at 297.
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in the rescue by stopping at his employer's suggestion, and his employer did not prevent at least the initiation of the attempt; O'Leary
entered an area which his employer had forbidden anyone to enter.
The distinction drawn by the Minnesota court between a rescue
opportunity in the form of an accident on the highway itself, and one
in the form of an accident visible from the highway but not on it, has
the same brittle arbitrary quality of the Minnesota decision which held
that injury by a stray bullet was not compensable because, having occurred on a vacant lot between a garage and office building rather
than on a genuine street, it was not a "street risk."24' 2 This kind of
fact-categorical approach to compensation law cannot survive long
when there is no real distinction in principle. There is only one valid
operative principle at work here: The employment thrust the employee
into contact with a situation in which it was natural and probable that
he as a human being would make the rescue attempt. If it had not
been for the conditions and obligations of the employment, this demand
upon the employee's natural human reactions would never have been
made and he would not have lost his life. More than this compensation law should not require.
Conclusion
It was observed at the outset that the positional-risk doctrine could
not as yet be accorded majority rule status, but that it had enlisted an
impressive and growing roster of adherents. On the strength of the
analysis just concluded, one may now essay a somewhat more specific
appraisal of the size of this roster.
Using as a guide either the adoption of the positional-risk rule by
name, or the application of it in practice, or both, one is entitled to
conclude that at least thirteen jurisdictions, have accepted the positionalrisk principle: Colorado, Louisiana, New Jersey, Kentucky, California,
Massachusetts, New York, Texas, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, South Dakota, Oklahoma, and
the United States Supreme Court.
A brief comment on each of these entries will indicate why they
have been included.
Colorado was the first positional-risk state, 243 and, starting with a
lightning case, 2 44 has generalized the principle to support awards in a
242. Aurnan v. Breckenridge Tel. Co., 188 Minn.256, 246 N.W. 889 (1933).
243. See note 3 supra.
244. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Colo. 233, 254 P. 995 (1927).
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lunatic-assault case2 45 and an unexplained-assault case. 240

Louisiana has carried the principle the furthest of all, and indeed,
as indicated earlier, has even overshot the mark somewhat by disregarding the "neutral-risk" limitation of the rule in personal-assault
cases. 247 Louisiana has clearly and repeatedly approved the positionalrisk doctrine in making awards for injuries as the result of tornadoes, 245 stray bullets, 24 9 personal assaults, 2 0 and rescue of strangers. -'c
New Jersey also ranks, high among the supporters of the doctrine,
having applied it to such diverse hazards as a stray arrow, 25 2 a kitchen

cabinet,2

31

a personal but non-private assault,254 an unexplained fall, 255

and a rescue of a stranger. 2

56

Kentucky has invoked the doctrine in a lunatic-assault case, 25 7 an
unexplained-assault case,25s and a falling-tree case,259 and has fortified
its claim to membership in this group by its explicit adoption of the
positional-risk rule by name in the first of these cases.
California's place on the list rests on a stray-bullet case, 00 in
which the court made a conscious choice of the positional-risk principle
over the less daring option of the "contact-with-the-premises" rule.
Massachusetts also has followed the doctrine in a stray-bullet
261
case -which is in some ways the most classic form of neutral riskand had also earlier accepted this approach in an unexplained-assault
2 62
award.
New York, while never quite coming right out and announcing
the adoption of the positional-risk rule by name, has probably pro245. London Guar. & Accident Co. v. McCoy, 97 Colo. 13, 45 P.2d 900 (1935).
246. Industrial Comm'n v. Ernest Irvine, Inc., 72 Colo. 573, 212 P. 829 (1923).
247. See text accompanying notes 174-75 supra.
248. Harvey v. Caddo DeSoto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 6 So. 2d 747 (1942).
249. Williams v. United States Cas. Co., 145 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 1962).
250. Rogers v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 173 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 1965); Gormings
v. Edwards, 222 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 1969).
251. Edwards v. Louisiana Forestry Comm'n, 221 La. 818, 60 So. 2d 449 (1952).
252. Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 13 N.J. 8, 97 A.2d 593 (1953).
253. Brooks v. Dee Realty Co., 72 N.J. Super. 499, 178 A.2d 644 (1962).
254. Crotty v. Driver Harris Co., 49 N.J. Super. 60, 139 A.2d 126 (1958); Martin v.
J.Lichtman & Sons, 42 N.J. 81, 199 A.2d 241 (1964).
255. Spindler v. Universal Chain Corp., 11 NJ. 34, 93 A.2d 171 (1952).
256. Reilly v. Weber Eng'r Co., 107 N.J. Super. 254, 258 A.2d 36 (1969).
257. Corken v. Corken Steel Prods., Inc., 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. App. 1965).
258. Coomes v. Robertson Lumber Co., 427 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. App. 1968).
259. Kaycee Coal Co. v. Short, 450 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. App. 1970).
260. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 95 Cal. App. 2d 805, 214
P.2d 41 (1950).
261. Baran's Case, 336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957).
262. McLean's Case, 323 Mass. 35, 80 N.E.2d 40 (1948).
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duced in effect more positional-risk awards than any other
jurisdiction.
265
4

263 flying debris, 2
The categories include: stray bullets,

flying owl, 266
falls. 269

insect bites,

trees, 267

injury by the talons of a
falling
unexplained assaults,268 and unexplained
Texas law has produced awards reflecting the positional-risk approach in a wasp-sting case,2 70 a lunatic-assault case,2 71 and an unex272
plained-assault case.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
definitely been a leader in the positional-risk movement, with its opinions on cases involving lunatic assaults,27 3 unexplained falls, 2 74 and
personal but non-private assaults.2 75
Hawaii's acceptance of the doctrine seems clear from the rationale
adopted in a lunatic-assault case.276
2 77
Idaho also has employed the principle in a lunatic-assault case,
as well as in an unexplained-assault situation. 8
South Dakota's inclusion in this group appears justified by its opinion awarding compensation in what is perhaps the closest of all positional-risk problems, that of a personal assault not traceable to the
parties' private lives. 9
Oklahoma is also listed here, on the strength of a recent unexplained-assault case, particularly because of the explicit approval by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court of the thesis here advanced as to unexplained assaults, falls, and deaths.2 0
263. See Christiansen v. Hill Reprod. Co., 262 App. Div. 379, 29 N.Y.S.2d 24, aff'd,
287 N.Y. 690, 39 N.E.2d 300 (1942). See notes 59-65 supra and accompanying text.
264. Filitti v. Lerode Homes Corp., 244 N.Y. 291, 155 N.E. 579 (1927); Malena v.
Leff, 265 N.Y. 533, 193 N.E. 307 (1934).
265. Webster v. Mason, 13 App. Div. 2d 355, 217 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1961); Richmond v.
Mass. & Birzt, 275 App. Div. 879, 88 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1949).
266. Avis v. Electrolux Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 717, 151 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1956).
267. Monahan v. Remington Rand, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 810, 192 N.Y.S.2d 900
(1959).
268. Fox v. Carpenters Local 606, 33 App. Div. 2d 605, 304 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1969).
269. Martin v. Plaut, 293 N.Y. 617, 59 N.E.2d 429 (1940). See note 176 supra
(New York cases).
270. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Williams, 378 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
271. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hampton, 414 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
272. Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Johnson, 148 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1945).
273. Hartford Acident & Indem. Co. v. Hoage, 85 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
274. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hoage, 62 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
275. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
276. Asaeda v. Haraguchi, 37 Hawaii 556 (1947).
277. Louis v. Bamboo Gardens, 67 Idaho 469, 185 P.2d 712 (1947).
278. Mayo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161, 457 P.2d 400 (1969).
279. Anderson v. Hotel Cataract, 70 S.D. 376, 17 N.W.2d 913 (1945).
280. B & B Nursing Home v. Blair, 496 P.2d 795 (Okla. 1972).
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Finally the Supreme Court of the United States is appropriately associated with these jurisdictions, in the light of its application of the
positional-risk principle to the rescue of a stranger.28 '
In addition to this group, there may be mentioned several states
in which the acceptance of the positional-risk approach is marginal or
inconclusive, because it rests on awards for unexplained risks. North
Dakota 2 2 and New Mexico 2 3 have made awards for unexplained assaults, and Connecticut, 2 4 Florida,285 Georgia, 28 6 and North Carolina 28" have made awards for unexplained falls. However, as discussed
in connection with unexplained deaths, although in a lesser degree,
there may be other factors at work in these decisions that keep them
from standing as clean-cut commitments to the positional-risk principle.
When a court makes an award in, say, a simple stray-bullet case, there
is almost no way in which that decision can avoid constituting outright
endorsement of the positional-risk rule. By contrast, in the "unexplained" cases, the inference is not so inescapable, since there may be
other arguments, such as presumptions of compensability, that blunt the
edge of the holding.
Nevertheless, it can always be argued that what is unexplained is
neutral, and from this premise the unexplained-fall and unexplainedassault cases, and even to some extent the unexplained-death cases,
may serve to open the door to the positional-risk principle in a number
of states.
The purpose of the present analysis has been, not only to show
how far the positional-risk doctrine has progressed, but also to demonstrate that it is and should be a pervading rule of causal relation, not
confined to any single factual category, but relevant to every risk that
can be called "neutral," including the unexplained risks. It is gratifying to note that almost all jurisdictions that have dealt with the question have accepted this view. The simplest and most obvious application is exemplified by Michigan's ready acceptance of the fact that, in
adopting the positional-risk rule for a tornado award,288 it necessarily
had to overrule a line of increased-risk lightning cases.289 Although a
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
Lippman v. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 79 N.D. 248, 55 N.W.2d 453 (1952).
Ensley v. Grace, 76 N.M. 691, 417 P.2d 885 (1966).
Ryerson v. A.E. Bounty Co., 107 Conn. 370, 140 A. 728 (1928).
Damon v. Central Hotel, 135 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1961).
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. King, 88 Ga. App. 176, 76 S.E.2d 81 (1953).
Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills, 220 N.C. 246, 17 S.E.2d 20 (1941).
Whetro v. Awkerman, 383 Mich. 235, 174 N.W.2d 783 (1970).
See note 35 supra.
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little less obvious, the carry-over between such risks as lightning and
unexplained falls has also been generally recognized, as in the pioneering but short-lived Indiana contribution to positional-risk history.29
That this carry-over is not always seen as self-evident, however, is
shown by the fact that Colorado, more than forty years after it launched
the positional-risk era, was still capable of denying compensation in a
straight unexplained-fall case.29 '
In judging the vigor and pace of the growth of the positional-risk
principle, one must bear in mind that the kind of fact situation that
forces a court to take a stand on this principle is relatively rare. The
vast majority of cases can be disposed of by finding some morsel of
increased risk, for example, creating a slightly greater hazard of exposure to lightning than that of the general public, or by taking refuge
in some half-way house such as a street-risk doctrine or the contactwith-the-premises exception. Looked at from this angle, the story is
significant for the scarcity of cases in which a court will hold the positional-risk up to view and then specifically reject it, as Missouri, for
example, has done.292 More common is the practice of considering
the doctrine and then concluding that, since the award can in any
event be affirmed on a less innovative theory, the court will not break
293
new ground when the case in hand does not require it.
In conclusion, then, it seems a safe prediction that, as true neutralrisk cases come before appellate courts for decision, the present strong
momentum of the positional-risk doctrine will before long carry it to
the point where it can be awarded the title of majority rule.
290. See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
291. Finn v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Colo. 106, 437 P.2d 542 (1968). See note 211
supra.
292. Lathrop v. Tobin-Hamilton Shoe Mfg. Co., 402 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
293. See, e.g., W.T. Edwards Hosp. v. Rakestraw, 114 So. 2d 802 (Fla. App. 1959),
where Florida followed this course.
The holding by the Supreme Court of Indiana in its affirmance of E.L DuPont de
Nemours Co. v. Lilly, 75 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. App. 1947), aff'd, 226 Ind. 267, 79 N.E.2d
387 (1948), was also of this character, but, as indicated in the text at that point, was
misinterpreted by the appellate court as a rejection of the positional-risk theory.

